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We present the first compositional, incremental static analysis for detecting memory-safety and information
leakage vulnerabilities in C-like programs. To do so, we develop the first under-approximate relational program
logics, including Insecurity Separation Logic (InsecSL). We show how InsecSL can be automated via back-
propagating symbolic execution (BPSE) to build a bottom-up, inter-procedural and incremental analysis for
detecting vulnerabilities. We prove our approach sound in Isabelle/HOL and implement it in a proof-of-concept
tool, Underflow, for analysing C programs, which we apply to various case studies.
1 INTRODUCTION
Modern software evolves rapidly; while rapid evolution provides fertile soil for the introduction
of security vulnerabilities [Massacci et al. 2011]. A growing consensus has emerged that, in the
context of modern continuous development methodologies, static analysis techniques need to
be both precise and incremental [Calcagno et al. 2015]. Precision ensures that developers’ time
is not wasted chasing false alarms. Incremental analyses can yield results in minutes even for
incredibly large code bases: having analysed revision 𝑛 of the software, an incremental analysis
checks revision 𝑛 + 1 by considering only the code whose behaviour has been modified between
the two revisions.
Building a precise, incremental vulnerability analysis is challenging, not least because security
vulnerabilities come in a variety of flavours, from simple safety property violations [Alpern and
Schneider 1987] like memory-safety issues (e.g. null pointer dereferences, use-after-free) through
to hyperproperty violations [Clarkson and Schneider 2010] like information leakage (e.g. side
channels). Indeed, to our knowledge, there exist no such analyses at present, despite the obvious
advantages they would have against the ever rising threat of software insecurity.
In this paper we build the first such analysis, which operates over a first-order imperative
language with pointers and dynamic allocation that is representative of a subset of C. Our analysis
is compositional and inter-procedural: it analyses a program one function at a time. The result of
analysing a function is a set of summaries that describe (a subset of) the function’s behaviours. These
can include ordinary “ok” behaviours inwhich the function terminates without exhibiting vulnerable
behaviour, “error” behaviours in which the function exhibits memory unsafety (dereferences or
frees an invalid pointer), and “insecure” behaviours in which the function leaks information. Our
analysis operates bottom-up, beginning with the leaf functions and finishing with the top-level
functions of the program. When analysing a function 𝑓 that calls another 𝑔, 𝑔’s summaries are
naturally employed to reason about how its behaviours contribute to those of 𝑓 . Thus our analysis
is naturally incremental: if function 𝑓 is modified, we need only recompute summaries for 𝑓 (and
its callers), and when doing so the summaries for 𝑔 can be re-used.
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This style of analysis requires a compact and precise way to represent behaviour summaries. For
this purpose we build a new under-approximate insecurity separation logic InsecSL, by combining
the Incorrectness Separation Logic of Raad et al. [2020] with the Security Separation Logic of Ernst
and Murray [2019]. In doing so, we show that the recent ideas of under-approximate program
logics [O’Hearn 2019; Raad et al. 2020] generalise to relational properties like information flow:
specifically under-approximate relational logics (of which InsecSL is an example) can precisely
prove the presence of relational property violations (e.g. information leakage). We also present the
first sound and and complete under-approximate relational logic, for the language IMP [Nipkow
and Klein 2014; Winskel 1993] and generalise Beringer’s relational decomposition [Beringer 2011]
to the under-approximate setting.
Behaviour summaries then take the form of under-approximate triples [𝑃] 𝑐 [𝑄] (the under-
approximate dual to ordinary over-approximate Hoare logic triples {𝑃} 𝑐 {𝑄} for precondition 𝑃 ,
program 𝑐 and postcondition 𝑄). Thus our summaries inherit the precision of logical analysis
methods like program logics and symbolic execution. Importantly, because these triples under-
approximate a function’s total behaviours, our analysis is free of false alarms (aka false positives):
all reported vulnerabilities are real.
With InsecSL to describe behaviour summaries, we develop a new intra-procedural symbolic
execution method to automatically infer them, which we call Back-Propagating Symbolic Execution
(BPSE). BPSE significantly extends prior bi-abduction based [Calcagno et al. 2009] symbolic ex-
ecution methods for inferring separation logic summaries by allowing for the first time to infer
precise summaries for programs that modify pointer variables, an incredibly common idiom in
imperative languages like C and Java. In the trivial program p++; *p that increments pointer p
before de-referencing it, the separation logic precondition (p + 1) ↦→ 𝑣 (for some fresh logical
variable 𝑣) summarises the heap that is required for this code to execute without error. Inferring
this summary requires, at the point of encountering the de-reference to p to infer the missing
assertion p ↦→ 𝑣 and then to back-propagate it over the preceding p++, transforming it to the
required (p + 1) ↦→ 𝑣 precondition. Traditional bi-abduction based symbolic execution [Calcagno
et al. 2009; Raad et al. 2020] has no means to perform this transformation. BPSE makes the novel
insight that it can be performed by applying traditional weakest precondition transformation over
the execution path followed during symbolic execution so far. This allows BPSE to infer precise,
sound summaries for arbitrary programs.
BPSE’s effectiveness is doubly surprising: firstly, inferring error summaries is impossible in
general in an over-approximate setting in the presence of nondeterminism [Calcagno et al. 2009,
Example 4.12]. Secondly, weakest precondition transformation is known to be unsound in general
in under-approximate logics [O’Hearn 2019]. We have discovered a restricted but practically useful
form of weakest precondition transformation that is sound in under-approximate logics. We present
BPSE in the context of InsecSL but its ideas are readily applicable to other under-approximate
separation logics like the Incorrectness Separation Logic (ISL) of Raad et al. [2020].
The final ingredient in our static analysis is extending the intra-procedural analysis of BPSE to an
inter-procedural one, in which the summaries for a callee are used during analysis of its callers. In
doing so we present the first inter-procedural, incremental analysis based on an under-approximate
program logic which, like BPSE, is equally applicable to other under-approximate logics.
We have prototyped our analysis in a proof-of-concept tool called Underflow, which treats
a subset of C. While Underflow treats fixed-width integers as mathematical ones, and supports
neither bit-level operations nor reasoning about code that takes the address of local (stack) variables,
these limitations are orthogonal to the contributions of this paper and their solutions are well
understood from prior work on separation logic based program analysis tools like Infer [Calcagno
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void run_auction (){
// ... allocate s, d, bid
// ... start the auction




// ... close the auction
}





void idqt_max(idqt *a, idqt *b){










… get_bid() add_bid() close_auction()
idqt_max()
Fig. 1. A sketch of the core of a sealed-bid auction server, inspired from https://bitbucket.org/covern/secc/src/
master/examples/case-studies/auction.c, including its callgraph.
and Distefano 2011], VeriFast [Jacobs et al. 2011], and so on. We demonstrate Underflow by
applying it to case studies that span information leakage and memory-safety vulnerabilities.
Contribution. The major contribution of this paper is showing for the first time how to detect
security vulnerabilities including information leakage compositionally and incrementally, without
false positives. Along the way we make a number of enabling contributions, each significant:
(1) BPSE for inferring precise summaries over arbitrary code (Sections 2.3 and 5)
(2) the discovery of a useful form of weakest precondition reasoning that is, in fact, sound in
under-approximate logic, contrary to prior expectation (Eq. (2), Definition 5.1, and Theo-
rem 5.2)
(3) how to do inter-procedural (i.e. incremental) analysis with under-approximate logic for the
first time (Sections 2.4, 6 and 7)
(4) the first sound and complete under-approximate relational program logic (in this case, for
IMP) (Section 3.3)
(5) under-approximate relational decomposition (Section 3.2)
(6) InsecSL, the first insecurity program logic, for detecting memory-safety and information
leakage vulnerabilities (Section 4)
(1)–(3) are all readily applicable to other under-approximate logics like ISL [Raad et al. 2020]. (4)
and (5) show that our ideas are applicable to other relational properties, beyond information flow.
All logics and proofs presented in this paper have been mechanised in Isabelle/HOL. Those
proofs, along with the tool Underflow and case studies, are available as supplementary material.
2 OVERVIEW ANDMOTIVATION
We motivate and provide an overview of the main ideas of this paper in the context of information
leakage vulnerabilities. However, as mentioned, they also cover memory-safety vulnerabilities
as well. We prefer to concentrate on information leakage, however, simply because we find such
vulnerabilities more interesting, and they are far harder to detect using traditional testing techniques.
2.1 When Barry met Carrie
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The program in Fig. 1 is adapted from an open-source sealed-bid auction server. In a sealed-bid
auction, all information about bids must be kept secret until after the auction is finished, at which
point only the winning bid is announced.
Bids in this auction are pairs of ints: (id, qt) where id is an identifier that identifies the bidder
who submitted the bid, and qt is the amount (or quote) submitted in the bid. The C struct type idqt
(whose definition is omitted) pairs these two values together.
The top-level function run_auction() maintains three simple pieces of state: the current maxi-
mum bid s, the auction status d, and the struct bid used to store newly submitted bids. New bids
are received via the get_bid() function, and processed by the add_bid() function. To process
a new bid, add_bid() compares it to the current maximum bid using the function idqt_max(),
which updates the current maximum so that it always refers to the maximum bid received so far.
Let us imagine a hypothetical scenario in which idqt_max() was originally written by Careful
Carrie, whose implementation appears in Appendix A. Carrie was careful to ensure that this code
was written in a style in which its execution never branches on a secret value. She did so to ensure
that this function, and therefore the auction server, never leaks information about bids while
processing them, in accordance with its goal of running a secure, sealed-bid auction.
Years after Carrie has written this code, and since left the organisation who deployed and
maintained it, let us imagine Brogrammer Barry takes over the maintenance of the auction server.
Barry decides that Carrie’s idqt_max() is inefficient since it unconditionally updates the s and
calls the logging function log_current_max() even when the maximum bid doesn’t change. He
therefore replaces it with the more efficient version shown in Fig. 1.
Unfortunately in doing so he introduces a timing leak that can be exploited by auction clients to
game the auction, since it allows them to infer whether the bid they have submitted is greater than
the current maximum or not.
This vulnerability arises due to the interaction of the various functions in the auction server.
For instance, a leaky idqt_max() would not be a problem if it was never called with secret data.
Thus we argue that detecting it requires an inter-procedural analysis. Given that Carrie’s code
was secure, discovering the leak should require only re-analysing idqt_max(), add_bid(), and
run_auction(). The remaining functions (some of which appear in the partial callgraph depicted
in Fig. 1) should not need re-analysing.
This style of incremental analysis is precisely what our approach, embodied in the proof-of-
concept tool Underflow, affords, due to its compositionality.
2.2 Summaries in Under-Approximate Relational Logic
The key to our approach is having a logical means to summarise the insecurity of individual
functions. Traditional logics of information flow security don’t talk directly about insecurity but
instead talk about security, which is of course its opposite. Broadly, such logics aim to prove that a
program is secure by over-approximating the program’s possible behaviours: by proving that this
over-approximation is secure, one can conclude that the original program is too.
To instead express insecurity, we discard over-approximate reasoning in favour of its under-
approximate counterpart. Under-approximate program logics have recently seen some study [O’Hearn
2019; Raad et al. 2020], after first being proposed a decade ago [De Vries and Koutavas 2011], for
their ability to detect program errors.
To our knowledge, so far such logics have not been applied to the detection of information leakage
vulnerabilities, like that exhibited in Fig. 1, nor been utilised for incremental, inter-procedural bug
detection of any kind.
Our approach solves both of these challenges.
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We express insecurity by generalising under-approximate reasoning to relational properties [Ben-
ton 2004; Yang 2007], i.e. properties that compare pairs of program executions. To see why insecurity
is a relational property, observe that the insecurity in Barry’s auction server is exhibited when we
compare two of its executions beginning from a state in which a single bid has been received. In the
first execution, the next bid received is larger than the one already received; in the second execution
it is smaller. In the first execution, Barry’s idqt_max() (in Fig. 1) will take the then branch of its
if-statement; the second execution branches the opposite way. Thus an observer (attacker) who
can deduce which branch was taken learns whether the newly submitted bid was higher than the
original one.
We design InsecSL, a relational under-approximate separation logic able to express this kind of
insecurity, that generalises the prior non-relational under-approximate Incorrectness Separation
Logic (ISL) [Raad et al. 2020]. InsecSL reasons about information leakage by reasoning about pairs
of program executions and, in particular, when they are distinguishable to some imagined attacker
who is observing the program’s execution (see Section 4.1). In InsecSL, we would express the
insecurity of Barry’s idqt_max() as follows:
[&b->qt ↦→ bqt ∗ &a->qt ↦→ aqt]
idqt_max(a,b)
[insec : bqt > aqt::/ℓ𝐴 ∗ &b->qt ↦→ bqt ∗ &a->qt ↦→ aqt]
Here the ∗ and ↦→ are InsecSL’s analogues of the traditional separating conjunction and points-to
assertions of separation logic. For a pointer expression 𝑒𝑝 , 𝑒𝑝 ↦→ 𝑒𝑣 means that at the heap location
to which expression 𝑒𝑝 evaluates holds the value to which expression 𝑒𝑣 evaluates. 𝑃 ∗𝑄 means that
the assertions 𝑃 and 𝑄 both hold and, moreover, refer to distinct parts of the heap. For a pointer p
to an idqt struct, &p->qt is read &(p->qt) and denotes the heap location in which the quote field
of the struct lives. For an expression 𝑒 , assertions 𝑒::/ℓ𝐴 state that 𝑒 is secret information that should
not be leaked.
In an under-approximate judgement [𝑃] 𝑐 [𝑄] about program code 𝑐 , the pre-assertion 𝑃 is called
the presumption and the post-assertion𝑄 the result [O’Hearn 2019]. In non-relational logics [DeVries
and Koutavas 2011; O’Hearn 2019; Raad et al. 2020] this judgement says that for all final states in
which 𝑄 holds there exists an initial state satisfying 𝑃 from which 𝑐 can execute to reach the final
state (that satisfied 𝑄).
Since InsecSL is a relational logic, its assertions talk about pairs of states [Ernst and Murray
2019]. The relational InsecSL judgement about idqt_max() above is read as follows: for all pairs
of final states in which the quote fields of the structs to which pointers a and b respectively point
hold the (arbitrary) values aqt and bqt respectively, in which the comparison bqt > aqt is secret
(not known to the attacker), there exists (identical) initial states in which the aforementioned struct
fields (necessarily) refer also to aqt and bqt from which execution can occur to reach the final
states, at which point the two executions will be distinguishable to the attacker.
The assertion bqt > aqt::/ℓ𝐴 states that whether bqt > aqt is not known to the attacker. Here
ℓ𝐴 denotes the attacker’s security level. This assertion (like all InsecSL assertions) is evaluated
over a pair of states (i.e. it compares two states), since InsecSL reasons about (compares) pairs of
program executions. The states being compared between these pairs of program executions always
represent the attacker’s knowledge, in the following sense: if some information (e.g. the value of
a variable, or the value stored in a heap location, or the result of a comparison like bqt > aqt) is
identical in both states being compared, then we say that the attacker knows that information. (We
make this precise later when we define the semantics of InsecSL assertions in Section 4.6.2.) Thus
when bqt > aqt::/ℓ𝐴 holds over a pair of states, it means that when we evaluate this greater-than
comparison (a boolean value) in each of the states and compare the results they are different: in
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void example(int *arr , int off){
int *p = arr + off;




void example(int *arr , int off){
[ 1 emp 4 ∗ (arr + off) ↦→ 𝑥 8 ∗ 𝑥 = 0::/ℓ𝐴 ]
int *p = arr + off;
[ok : 2 p = arr + off 3 ∗ p ↦→ 𝑥 7 ∗ 𝑥 = 0::/ℓ𝐴 ]
int v = *p;




Fig. 2. A function (left) and inference (right) of an insecurity summary via back-propagating symbolic
execution (BPSE). Green assertions are those inferred to make forward progress in symbolic execution; brown
ones infer conditions under which information leakage occurs. Circled numbers indicate the steps of the BPSE
process; grayed circles indicate optional steps in which non-spatial (pure) assertions are back-propagated.
one state the comparison evaluates to true while in the other it evaluates to false. This explains
why the two executions of course branch in different directions and, hence, leak information about
this comparison.
We formally define InsecSL and establish its soundness later in Section 4.
2.3 Summary Inference via Back-Propagating Symbolic Execution (BPSE)
The left of Fig. 2 depicts a tiny example function that takes an array (pointer) arr and offset off
and branches on whatever value is stored at arr[off] and, hence, leaks this value. This insecurity
is captured by the following summary:
[arr + off ↦→ 𝑥] example(arr,off) [insec : 𝑥 = 0::/ℓ𝐴 ∗ arr + off ↦→ 𝑥] (1)
Specifically, in accordance with the behaviour of C conditionals, when executing the if-condition,
the boolean condition that is branched on is whether whatever value 𝑥 that is loaded from the
pointer p is zero, where p at this point is equal to arr + off.
To infer this summary, we propose a variant of forward symbolic execution traditionally applied
to automate specification inference in separation logics [Calcagno et al. 2009] that we call back-
propagating symbolic execution (BPSE). BPSE automates the application of InsecSL to infer function
summaries.
How BPSE does this inference for the example program is depicted in the right of Fig. 2. Analysis
begins 1 at the start of the function with the separation logic assertion emp that denotes the
empty heap (i.e. initially nothing is known). Symbolically executing the assignment to local variable
p yields the fact 2 that p = arr + off. To symbolically execute the following dereference (load)
of p, that pointer must be valid. Thus, BPSE infers 3 the requirement for the assertion p ↦→ 𝑥
for some fresh logical variable 𝑥 . However, the initial state (emp) from which symbolic execution
began said nothing to imply that p would be a valid pointer at this stage of execution. Therefore
this new fact p ↦→ 𝑥 must be back-propagated to (loosely) deduce what would have had to have
been true when execution began in order for this fact to hold at this stage when it is introduced.
Doing so requires being able to reason backwards over the preceding assignment statement
p = arr + off. Perhaps surprisingly, backwards reasoning is not, in general, sound in under-
approximate logics. Specifically as O’Hearn [2019] demonstrated, the following “weakest-precondition”
rule does not hold in such logics for assignment statements:
[ 𝑄 [𝑒/𝑥] ] 𝑥 := 𝑒 [ 𝑄 ]
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That is, given an arbitrary result assertion𝑄 and the statement that assigns the value of expression 𝑒
to local variable 𝑥 , we cannot calculate a presumption in which the above judgement holds in the
usual way from over-approximate Hoare logics, by taking 𝑄 and replacing all occurrences of 𝑥
with 𝑒 .
The crucial insight that underpins the soundness of BPSE, however, is that when back-propagating
over assignment statements (and others) we don’t have arbitrary result assertions 𝑄 . Instead, the
back-propagation problem is of the following, more restricted, form.
When back-propagating we begin with an existing judgement that we wish to augment. For
instance when back-propagating the inferred assertion p ↦→ 𝑥 over the assignment p = arr + off
in Fig. 2, we already know that the following judgement holds (since it was derived via the earlier
symbolic execution step 2 ):
[emp] p = arr + off [ok : p = arr + off]
Back propagation asks, given that we wish to augment the result assertion here with p ↦→ 𝑥 , how
must we augment the presumption so that we still have a valid InsecSL judgement?
Thus the back-propagation problem (for assignment statements 𝑥 := 𝑒) has the following form.
Given an existing judgement [𝑃1] 𝑥 := 𝑒 [𝑃2] and some additional assertion 𝑄 we wish to conjoin
to the result, how do we transform𝑄 so that it can be conjoined to the presumption to yield a valid
judgement. The following rule shows how:
[𝑃1] 𝑥 := 𝑒 [𝑃2]
[𝑃1 ∗𝑄 [𝑒/𝑥]] 𝑥 := 𝑒 [𝑃2 ∗𝑄]
(2)
The twist is that 𝑄 should be transformed exactly as it would be in an over-approximate logic
via traditional weakest-precondition transformation. This same idea applies equally well to other
program statements besides assignments to local variables, and is the foundation of BPSE.
Applying it therefore in the example of Fig. 2 back-propagates 4 the assertion p ↦→ 𝑥 over the
assignment statement, transforming it to become arr + off ↦→ 𝑥 .
Thus BPSE can now proceed 5 past the load v = *p of pointer p. In doing so it now encounters
the control-flow branch on v. It infers 6 that this branch can leak information if v being zero or
not is secret, i.e. when v = 0::/ℓ𝐴.
At this point BPSE has inferred the following insecurity summary for the internal behaviour of
example(), where “. . . ” abbreviates the code considered to this point:
[emp ∗ (arr + off) ↦→ 𝑥] . . . [insec : v = 𝑥 ∗ p = arr + off ∗ 𝑝 ↦→ 𝑥 ∗ v = 0::/ℓ𝐴]
It can be turned into an insecurity summary for example()’s external behaviour (to be useful
for inter-procedural analysis) by existentially quantifying over the local variables, in this case v.
Doing so, and then simplifying, yields the original insecurity summary Eq. (1) (since emp ∗ 𝑃 is
semantically equivalent to 𝑃 for all assertions 𝑃 ).
We note that while further back-propagation steps could be applied to back-propagate v = 0::/ℓ𝐴,
as we explain shortly, back-propagating so-called pure (or non-spatial) assertions is not necessary
when inferring function summaries. Pure assertions are those that do not talk about the heap, and
so include assertions like 𝑒::/ℓ𝐴 and bqt > aqt etc. but not assertions like 𝑒𝑝 ↦→ 𝑒𝑣 . Hence, steps 7
and 8 in Fig. 2 are optional.
To understand why pure assertions don’t need to be back-propagated when inferring summaries
for functions, first note that because such summaries talk about the external behaviour of a function,
their presumptions can refer only to the function’s formal parameters (e.g. arr, off for example()),
and logical variables (e.g. 𝑥 ).
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Like much other work [Greenaway et al. 2014; Winwood et al. 2009], the subset of C that we treat
disallows taking the address of a stack variable. (This limitation can be lifted, of course, by moving
such variables into the heap, as is also common [Cohen et al. 2009; Jacobs et al. 2011]). Hence, the
external behaviour of any function can never modify the stack (as observed by its caller). Therefore
the stack before and after calling a function will appear unchanged. Pure assertions necessarily
refer only to the stack. Hence any such assertion holds before a function call iff it holds afterwards.
Thus for some function func(args), any summary [𝑃] func(args) [𝑄] is logically equivalent to
one in which all pure assertions in𝑄 are conjoined with 𝑃 . That is, if𝑄 ′ denotes the conjunction of
all pure assertions in 𝑄 , then the preceding judgement is equivalent to [𝑃 ∗𝑄 ′] func(args) [𝑄].
Therefore, to avoid duplication, we write function summaries in under-approximate separation
logics like InsecSL in a normal form in which the presumption never contains pure assertions. This
explains why, for instance, pure assertions are absent from the presumption of Eq. (1).
We formalise and prove the soundness of BPSE later in Section 5.
2.4 Bottom-Up, Inter-Procedural Analysis
The BPSE procedure described so far is sufficient to infer summaries for leaf functions. For a single
function, it might infer many summaries since, like traditional symbolic execution, BPSE can fork
its execution to explore multiple paths of execution through the function, and each path might
yield a different summary.
The summaries for a single function can include, besides insecurity summaries, also error
summaries (in which a memory-safety violation occurs, for instance), plus “ok” summaries that
describe behaviours of the function in which it terminates without error or insecurity. The latter
are inferred when BPSE along a particular path reaches the end of the function. As we describe
later in Section 7, loops and recursion can be explored by unrolling up to a fixed bound.
Having inferred summaries for the leaf functions, our inter-procedural analysis then uses those
summaries to perform BPSE on their callers and infer summaries for them. For instance, the
summary Eq. (1) is used during BPSE of its caller add_bid() to infer a summary that states that
add_bid() can also leak information when the result of the greater-than comparison between the
quote of the new bid bid and the current maximum s is secret. That summary is used, in turn,
during BPSE of the top-level run_auction() function. In this way, the analysis proceeds bottom-up
from the leaves of the callgraph to its roots.
Library functions like get_bid() need to be suppliedwith user-written summaries. The following
summary states that get_bid() can return arbitrary bids in the out parameter bid:
[&bid->id ↦→ id ∗ &bid->qt ↦→ qt] get_bid(bid) [ok : &bid->id ↦→ nid ∗ &bid->qt ↦→ nqt]
This “ok” summary is used, for instance, during BPSE of the top-level run_auction() function,
and allows symbolic execution to proceed past the call to get_bid().
Importantly, the insecurity summary for add_bid() inferred by BPSE states that it behaves
insecurely only when the status of the auction, stored in the heap location to which d points, is
Ongoing. In particular, the auction begins in (i.e. with d pointing to) the Ready state, when no bids
have yet been received. add_bid() has an “ok” summary that states that when called in the Ready
state, it updates the auction status stored in d to Ongoing and writes the initial bid to s.
That “ok” summary is used during BPSE of the first iteration of the while-loop in run_auction()
to reach the end of that loop iteration. On the second loop iteration (when the auction state is now
Ongoing), the insecurity summary inferred for add_bid() can then be used to infer the insecure
behaviour of run_auction().
Thus detecting the insecurity in Barry’s updated auction server implementation requires inferring
new summaries for idqt_max(), add_bid() and, finally, run_auction(). Inferring the insecurity
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summary for run_auction() requires BPSE to unfold the while-loop at least twice, since its
insecurity is only exhibited on the second (and later) loop iterations.
We explain precisely how a summary [𝑃𝑔] 𝑔() [𝑄𝑔] inferred for a callee 𝑔() is used during BPSE
of its caller 𝑓 () to infer summaries for 𝑓 () later in Section 6.
3 WARM UP: UNDER-APPROXIMATE RELATIONAL REASONING FOR IMP
InsecSL is formally defined for a core imperative language with pointers. As a warm-up exercise, and
to illustrate in general how under-approximate reasoning can be lifted to a relational setting, we first
consider themuch simpler imperative language IMP, which is commonly used as a teaching language
for over-approximate Hoare logic [Nipkow and Klein 2014]. We define an under-approximate
relational logic for IMP that is sound and complete. Unlike InsecSL, which is targeted towards
detecting insecurity and memory-safety errors, our under-approximate relational logic for IMP
supports general relational reasoning, in which one wishes to relate pairs of executions of two
(possibly different) programs. Such reasoning, we argue, is suitable for detecting violations of
various relational properties, including determinism, noninterference [Goguen and Meseguer 1982]
(absence of certain kinds of information leakage), function sensitivity, and program equivalence.
However this paper does not explore its general applications (beyond a few examples involving
detection of simple information leaks, in Appendix B) since this logic for IMP is designed as a
proof-of-concept (that one can lift relational reasoning to the under-approximate setting), rather
than as an easily usable tool.
IMP has a standard big-step semantics, defined over states 𝑠 and 𝑡 that map variables to values.
We write (𝑐, 𝑠) ⇒ 𝑡 to mean that when program 𝑐 begins execution in state 𝑠 it terminates in state 𝑡 .
Then De Vries and Koutavas [2011] give formal meaning to the non-relational under-approximate
judgement |= [𝑃] 𝑐 [𝑄] by defining under-approximate Hoare logic validity as follows.
Definition 3.1 (Under-approximate Hoare logic validity).
|= [𝑃] 𝑐 [𝑄] def= (∀ 𝑡 . 𝑄 (𝑡) =⇒ (∃ 𝑠 . 𝑃 (𝑠) ∧ (𝑐, 𝑠) ⇒ 𝑡))
Here 𝑃 and 𝑄 are predicates (evaluated over single states). Recall that 𝑃 is called the presumption
and 𝑄 is called the result [O’Hearn 2019]. This triple guarantees that all states in the result 𝑄
can always be reached from at least one state that satisfies the presumption 𝑃 . In this sense, 𝑄
under-approximates the post-states that can be reached when 𝑐 executes from a 𝑃-state.
To lift this definition to a relational setting, we replace 𝑃 and 𝑄 with binary relations that relate
pairs of states. For such a relation 𝑅 we write 𝑅(𝑠, 𝑠 ′) when states 𝑠 and 𝑠 ′ are related by 𝑅. Then
we define under-approximate relational validity as the relational analogue of under-approximate
Hoare logic validity above.
Definition 3.2 (Under-Approximate Relational Validity). Given a presumption (pre) relation 𝑅 and
a result (post) relation 𝑆 , under-approximate relational validity is denoted ⊨ [𝑅] 𝑐, 𝑐 ′ [𝑆]:
⊨ [𝑅] 𝑐, 𝑐 ′ [𝑆] def= (∀ 𝑡 𝑡 ′. 𝑆 (𝑡, 𝑡 ′) =⇒ (∃ 𝑠 𝑠 ′. 𝑅(𝑠, 𝑠 ′) ∧ (𝑐, 𝑠) ⇒ 𝑡 ∧ (𝑐 ′, 𝑠 ′) ⇒ 𝑡 ′))
3.1 Detecting Violations of Relational Properties
What is under-approximate relational reasoning good for? As O’Hearn [2019] shows, under-
approximate Hoare logic is useful for proving the presence of software bugs like failed assert
statements. In other words, for proving safety property violations [Alpern and Schneider 1987].
Therefore, we should expect that under-approximate relational reasoning should be useful for
proving violations of relational (hypersafety [Clarkson and Schneider 2010]) properties. We make
this intuition precise by showing how our under-approximate relational validity can characterise
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violations of over-approximate relational validity (i.e. violations of relational properties like deter-
minism, noninterference etc.). We first formally define over-approximate relational validity [Benton
2004], which lifts Hoare logic partial correctness to the relational setting.
Definition 3.3 (Over-Approximate Relational Validity). Given binary state relations 𝑅 and 𝑆 and
programs 𝑐 and 𝑐 ′, we write |= {𝑅} 𝑐, 𝑐 ′ {𝑆} to mean:
∀𝑠 𝑠 ′ 𝑡 𝑡 ′. 𝑅(𝑠, 𝑠 ′) ∧ (𝑐, 𝑠) ⇒ 𝑡 ∧ (𝑐 ′, 𝑠 ′) ⇒ 𝑡 ′ =⇒ 𝑆 (𝑡, 𝑡 ′)
We first note that a pair of programs 𝑐 and 𝑐 ′ do not satisfy |= {𝑅} 𝑐, 𝑐 ′ {𝑆} when there exist initial
states 𝑠 and 𝑠 ′ for which 𝑅(𝑠, 𝑠 ′), and final states 𝑡 and 𝑡 ′ for which (𝑐, 𝑠) ⇒ 𝑡 and (𝑐 ′, 𝑠 ′) ⇒ 𝑡 ′, and
it is the case that ¬𝑆 (𝑡, 𝑡 ′).
Observe that this is an instance of under-approximate relational validity.
Proposition 3.4. For programs 𝑐 and 𝑐 ′ and pre- and post-relations𝑅 and 𝑆 respectively, |= {𝑅} 𝑐, 𝑐 ′ {𝑆}
does not hold if and only if there exists some non-empty relation 𝑆 ′, for which
(𝑆 ′ =⇒ ¬𝑆) and ⊨ [𝑅] 𝑐, 𝑐 [𝑆 ′]
Thus under-approximate relational reasoning can detect violations of relational properties.
3.2 Under-Approximate Relational Decomposition
Before presenting our under-approximate relational logic for IMP, we first pause to consider the
question of whether we can decompose under-approximate relational reasoning into some form
of (non-relational) Hoare logic reasoning. Much prior work has shown how to perform over-
approximate relational reasoning via over-approximate Hoare logics and program verification
methods, e.g. via product-program constructions [Barthe et al. 2011a, 2013, 2011b; Eilers et al. 2018].
For over-approximate relational logic, Beringer [2011] showed how one can decompose rela-
tional reasoning into over-approximate Hoare logic reasoning. We show that the same is true
for under-approximate relational logic, in which relational reasoning can be decomposed into
under-approximate Hoare logic reasoning. Thus under-approximate Hoare logics can be used to
perform under-approximate relational reasoning.
The essence of the approach is to decompose ⊨ [𝑅] 𝑐, 𝑐 ′ [𝑆] into two statements: one about 𝑐
and the other about 𝑐 ′. ⊨ [𝑅] 𝑐, 𝑐 ′ [𝑆] says that for every 𝑆-pair of final states 𝑡 and 𝑡 ′, we can find
an 𝑅-pair of states 𝑠 and 𝑠 ′ from which 𝑡 and 𝑡 ′ can be reached respectively by executing 𝑐 and 𝑐 ′.
To decompose this we think about what it would mean to first execute 𝑐 on its own. At this point
we would have reached a state 𝑡 which has a 𝑐-predecessor 𝑠 for which 𝑅(𝑠, 𝑠 ′), and the execution
of 𝑐 ′ would not yet have begun and would still be in the state 𝑠 ′ which has a 𝑐 ′-successor 𝑡 ′ for
which 𝑆 (𝑡, 𝑡 ′). We write decomp(𝑅, 𝑐, 𝑐 ′, 𝑆) that defines this relation that holds between 𝑡 and 𝑠 ′:
decomp(𝑅, 𝑐, 𝑐 ′, 𝑆) (𝑡, 𝑠 ′) def= ∃ 𝑠 𝑡 ′. 𝑅(𝑠, 𝑠 ′) ∧ (𝑐, 𝑠) ⇒ 𝑡 ∧ (𝑐 ′, 𝑠 ′) ⇒ 𝑡 ′ ∧ 𝑆 (𝑡, 𝑡 ′)
This allows us to decompose ⊨ [𝑅] 𝑐, 𝑐 ′ [𝑆] into two separate relational statements about 𝑐
and 𝑐 ′. Here we use IMP’s no-op command skip to indicate when one command executes but the
other does not make a corresponding step, to simulate the idea that first 𝑐 executes followed by 𝑐 ′.
Lemma 3.5 (Relational Validity Decomposition). For relations 𝑅 and 𝑆 and commands 𝑐 and 𝑐 ′,
⊨ [𝑅] 𝑐, 𝑐 ′ [𝑆] ⇐⇒
(
⊨ [𝑅] 𝑐, skip [decomp(𝑅, 𝑐, 𝑐 ′, 𝑆)] ∧
⊨ [decomp(𝑅, 𝑐, 𝑐 ′, 𝑆)] skip, 𝑐 ′ [𝑆]
)
Proof. From the definitions of ⊨ [𝑅] 𝑐, 𝑐 ′ [𝑆] and decomp(𝑅, 𝑐, 𝑐 ′, 𝑆). □
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Now, for arbitrary relations 𝑅 and 𝑆 , statements of the form ⊨ [𝑅] 𝑐, skip [𝑆] and the symmetric
⊨ [𝑅] skip, 𝑐 ′ [𝑆] talk about only one execution (since the second command skip doesn’t execute
by definition). And indeed they can be expressed equivalently as statements in under-approximate
Hoare logic, as the following lemma shows. (We omit the symmetric case for brevity.)
Lemma 3.6.
⊨ [𝑅] skip, 𝑐 ′ [𝑆] ⇐⇒ (∀ 𝑡 . |= [𝑅(𝑡)] 𝑐 ′ [𝑆 (𝑡)])
Theorem 3.7 below follows straightforwardly from Lemma 3.5 and Lemma 3.6. It states how
every under-approximate relational statement ⊨ [𝑅] 𝑐, 𝑐 ′ [𝑆] can be decomposed into two under-
approximate Hoare logic statements: one about 𝑐 and the other about 𝑐 ′.
Theorem 3.7. Under-Approximate Relational Decomposition
⊨ [𝑅] 𝑐, 𝑐 ′ [𝑆] if and only if(
∀ 𝑡 ′. |= [(_ 𝑡 . 𝑅(𝑡, 𝑡 ′))] 𝑐 [(_ 𝑡 . decomp(𝑅, 𝑐, 𝑐 ′, 𝑆) (𝑡, 𝑡 ′))] ∧
∀ 𝑡 . |= [decomp(𝑅, 𝑐, 𝑐 ′, 𝑆) (𝑡)] 𝑐 ′ [𝑄 (𝑡)]
)
This theorem implies that all valid under-approximate relational properties can be proved using
sound and complete under-approximate Hoare logics like [De Vries and Koutavas 2011; O’Hearn
2019]. This theorem therefore provides strong evidence for the applicability of under-approximate
reasoning methods (such as under-approximate symbolic execution) for proving under-approximate
relational properties, including e.g. via product program constructions, as mentioned above [Barthe
et al. 2011a, 2013, 2011b; Eilers et al. 2018].
3.3 Under-Approximate Relational Hoare Logic
The previous section shows that we can use sound-and-complete under-approximate Hoare logics
as sound and complete methods to carry out under-approximate relational reasoning. We put this
to work by developing a sound and complete under-approximate relational logic for IMP.
Commands 𝑐 in IMP include variable assignment, sequencing, conditionals (if-then-else state-
ments), iteration (while-loops), and the terminating command skip.
𝑐 ::= 𝑥 := 𝑒 | 𝑐; 𝑐 | if 𝑏 then 𝑐 else 𝑐 | while 𝑏 do 𝑐 | skip
Here, 𝑒 and 𝑏 denote respectively (integer) arithmetic and boolean expressions.
The big-step semantics of IMP is entirely standard (omitted for brevity) and defines its semantics
over states 𝑠 that map variables 𝑥 to (integer) values. It is characterised by the judgement (𝑐, 𝑠) ⇒ 𝑡
encountered earlier: command 𝑐 when executed in initial state 𝑠 terminates in state 𝑡 .
Judgements of the logic are written ⊢ [𝑅] 𝑐, 𝑐 ′ [𝑆]. Fig. 3 depicts the rules of the logic. For
⊢ [𝑅] 𝑐, 𝑐 ′ [𝑆] we define a set of rules for each command 𝑐 . Almost all of these rules has a
counterpart in under-approximate Hoare logic [De Vries and Koutavas 2011; O’Hearn 2019]. There
are also three additional rules (Conseq, Disj, and Sym). Of these, only the final one Sym does not
have a counterpart in prior under-approximate logics.
The Skip rule simply encodes the meaning of ⊨ [𝑅] skip, 𝑐 ′ [𝑆] in the premise. That premise
can of course be discharged using under-approximate Hoare logic reasoning, via Lemma 3.6. This
is where this logic puts the decomposition of the previous section to work.
The Seq1 rule essentially encodes the intuition that ⊨ [𝑅] (𝑐; 𝑑), 𝑐 ′ [𝑆] holds precisely when
⊨ [𝑅] (𝑐 ; 𝑑), (𝑐 ′; skip) [𝑆] does. However we can also view this rule differently: once 𝑐 and 𝑐 ′ have
both been executed, the left-hand side still has 𝑑 to execute; however the right-hand side is done,
represented by skip. The relation 𝑆 then serves as a witness for linking the two steps together.
This same pattern is seen in the other rules too: given the pre-relation𝑅 theAssign rule essentially
computes the witness relation 𝑅 [𝑥 := 𝑒] that holds following the assignment 𝑥 := 𝑒 , which (like
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the corresponding rule in O’Hearn [2019]) simply applies the strongest-postcondition predicate
transformer to 𝑅.
The rules for if-statements, IfTrue and IfFalse, are the relational analogues of the corresponding
rules from under-approximate Hoare logic. The rules WhileTrue and WhileFalse encode the
branching structure of unfolding a while-loop. The rule Back-Var is the analogue of the “backwards
variant” iteration rule from De Vries and Koutavas [2011]; O’Hearn [2019]. Here 𝑅 is a family of
relations indexed by natural number 𝑛 (which can be thought of as an iteration count) such that
the corresponding relation 𝑅(𝑘) must hold after the 𝑘th iteration. Unlike the corresponding rule
in O’Hearn [2019], this rule explicitly encodes that the loop executes for some number of times
(possibly 0) to reach a frontier, at which point ∃ 𝑛. 𝑅(𝑛) holds and the remainder of the loop is
related to command 𝑐 ′.
The Conseq and Disj rules are the relational analogues of their counterparts in O’Hearn [2019].
Finally, the Sym rule allows to flip the order of 𝑐 and 𝑐 ′ when reasoning about ⊢ [𝑅] 𝑐, 𝑐 ′ [𝑆] so
long as the relations are flipped accordingly, denoted 𝑅−1 etc. Naturally, this rule is necessary for
the logic to be complete.
∀ 𝑡 𝑡 ′. 𝑆 (𝑡, 𝑡 ′) =⇒ ∃𝑠 ′. 𝑅(𝑡, 𝑠 ′) ∧ (𝑐 ′, 𝑠 ′) ⇒ 𝑡 ′
⊢ [𝑅] skip, 𝑐 ′ [𝑆]
Skip
⊢ [𝑅] 𝑐, 𝑐 ′ [𝑆] ⊢ [𝑆] 𝑑, skip [𝑇 ]
⊢ [𝑅] (𝑐; 𝑑), 𝑐 ′ [𝑇 ]
Seq1
⊢ [𝑅 [𝑥 := 𝑒]] skip, 𝑐 ′ [𝑆]
⊢ [𝑅] 𝑥 := 𝑒, 𝑐 ′ [𝑆]
Assign
⊢ [𝑅 ∧ 𝑏1] 𝑐1, 𝑐 ′ [𝑆]
⊢ [𝑅] if 𝑏 then 𝑐1 else 𝑐2, 𝑐 ′ [𝑆]
IfTrue
⊢ [𝑅 ∧ ¬𝑏1] 𝑐2, 𝑐 ′ [𝑆]
⊢ [𝑅] if 𝑏 then 𝑐1 else 𝑐2, 𝑐 ′ [𝑆]
IfFalse
⊢ [𝑅 ∧ ¬𝑏1] skip, 𝑐 ′ [𝑆]
⊢ [𝑅] while 𝑏 do 𝑐, 𝑐 ′ [𝑆]
WhileFalse
⊢ [𝑅 ∧ 𝑏1] (𝑐; while 𝑏 do 𝑐), 𝑐 ′ [𝑆]
⊢ [𝑅] while 𝑏 do 𝑐, 𝑐 ′ [𝑆]
WhileTrue
∀ 𝑛. ⊢ [𝑅(𝑛) ∧ 𝑏1] 𝑐, skip [𝑅(𝑛 + 1)] ⊢ [∃ 𝑛. 𝑅(𝑛)] while 𝑏 do 𝑐, 𝑐 ′ [𝑆]
⊢ [𝑅(0)] while 𝑏 do 𝑐, 𝑐 ′ [𝑆]
Back-Var
𝑅1 =⇒ 𝑅2 ⊢ [𝑅1] 𝑐, 𝑐 ′ [𝑆1] 𝑆2 =⇒ 𝑆1
⊢ [𝑅2] 𝑐, 𝑐 ′ [𝑆2]
Conseq
⊢ [𝑅1] 𝑐, 𝑐 ′ [𝑆1] ⊢ [𝑅2] 𝑐, 𝑐 ′ [𝑆2]
⊢ [𝑅1 ∨ 𝑅2] 𝑐, 𝑐 ′ [𝑆1 ∨ 𝑆2]
Disj
⊢ [𝑅−1] 𝑐 ′, 𝑐 [𝑆−1]
⊢ [𝑅] 𝑐, 𝑐 ′ [𝑆]
Sym
Fig. 3. Proof rules. R[x:=e] denotes the transformer on relation 𝑅 following the assignment 𝑥 := 𝑒 . It is defined
as: 𝑅 [𝑥 := 𝑒] def= _ 𝑠 𝑠 ′. ∃ 𝑣 . 𝑅(𝑠 (𝑥 := 𝑣), 𝑠 ′) ∧ 𝑠 (𝑥) = [𝑒]𝑠 (𝑥 :=𝑣) . Logical operators ∧ and ∨ are lifted to
relations, e.g.: 𝑅 ∧𝑆 def= _ 𝑠 𝑠 ′. 𝑅(𝑠, 𝑠 ′) ∧𝑆 (𝑠, 𝑠 ′). For boolean expression 𝑏, 𝑏1 ≡ _ 𝑠 𝑠 ′. [𝑏]𝑠 , where [𝑏]𝑠 denotes
evaluating expression 𝑏 in state 𝑠 . Also, ∃ 𝑛. 𝑅(𝑛) def= _ 𝑠 𝑠 ′. ∃ 𝑛. 𝑅(𝑛) (𝑠, 𝑠 ′). 𝑅 =⇒ 𝑆 denotes when relation 𝑅
is a subset of relation 𝑆 . Finally, 𝑅−1
def
= _ 𝑠 𝑠 ′. 𝑅(𝑠 ′, 𝑠).
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3.4 Soundness and Completeness
The proofs of soundness and completeness follow similar structures to their counterparts for
under-approximate Hoare logic [O’Hearn 2019]
Theorem 3.8 (Soundness). For relations 𝑅 and 𝑆 and commands 𝑐 and 𝑐 ′, if ⊢ [𝑅] 𝑐, 𝑐 ′ [𝑆] then
⊨ [𝑅] 𝑐, 𝑐 ′ [𝑆].
Proof. By structural induction on ⊢ [𝑅] 𝑐, 𝑐 ′ [𝑆]. Almost all cases are straightforward. The only
exception is the Back-Var rule, which, similarly to O’Hearn [2019], requires an induction on the
argument 𝑛 to 𝑅(𝑛) and generalising the result from 𝑅(0) to some 𝑅(𝑘) to get a sufficiently strong
induction hypothesis. □
Theorem 3.9 (Completeness). For relations 𝑅 and 𝑆 and commands 𝑐 and 𝑐 ′, if ⊨ [𝑅] 𝑐, 𝑐 ′ [𝑆]
then ⊢ [𝑅] 𝑐, 𝑐 ′ [𝑆].
Proof. By induction on 𝑐 . This proof follows a similar structure to the completeness proof
of O’Hearn [2019]. □
We refer the reader to our Isabelle formalisation for further details on these proofs.
4 INSECURITY SEPARATION LOGIC
So, under-approximate reasoning can be lifted to reason about violations of relational properties,
and so (at least in theory) detect information leakage vulnerabilities and other errors.
In this section we design the first practical logic for doing so, which we call Insecurity Separation
Logic (InsecSL). InsecSL is the foundation of our approach. As described in Section 2.2, we use
InsecSL judgements to summarise insecure (and other behaviours) of functions. Later, in Section 5,
we will see how such summaries can be automatically inferred by automating the application of
InsecSL via back-propagating symbolic execution (BPSE).
InsecSL is defined for a simple imperative language with pointers and dynamic memory allo-
cation. This logic has the structure of an (under-approximate) separation logic [Raad et al. 2020],
and so naturally supports local reasoning, which is crucial for the inter-procedural analysis we
describe later in Section 6. InsecSL is tailored specifically to detecting violations of timing-sensitive
noninterference. We define this more precisely later in Section 4.1 but roughly such violations
include information leaks caused when the number of execution steps (e.g. loop iterations) of a
program depends on a secret, or when the program branches on a secret (like Barry’s idqt_max()
in Fig. 1), or when it publicly outputs a secret value (e.g. by writing it out onto the network where
an attacker can see it). (For readers of Appendix B, note that this security property is stronger than
the termination-insensitive noninterference of Definition B.1.)
InsecSL is inspired by two other logics: (1) Incorrectness Separation Logic [Raad et al. 2020]
(ISL), an under-approximate separation logic, and (2) the sequential part of Security Concurrent
Separation Logic [Ernst and Murray 2019] (SecCSL), an over-approximate relational separation
logic [Yang 2007] for proving timing-sensitive noninterference. It is able to prove the presence
of safety property violations similarly to ISL, for instance memory-safety errors. It is also able to
prove the presence of timing-sensitive noninterference violations (information leaks). Since it is
tailored for reasoning about security violations, we christen InsecSL the first insecurity logic.
InsecSL’s soundness has been mechanised in Isabelle/HOL.
4.1 Timing-Sensitive Security (Attacker Model)
Before going further, we clarify the attacker model for the timing-sensitive noninterference property
that InsecSL reasons about, i.e. what kinds of information leaks our approach detects. We imagine
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that the execution of the program in question is being observed by an attacker, who has certain
observational powers and initial knowledge and is trying to deduce secret information that the
program is trying to protect. An information leak occurs if the attacker can deduce some secret
information that they did not already know.
As standard, the attacker is assumed to know the program being executed. They are also as-
sumed to know certain initial values in memory. All other information is considered secret, and
noninterference requires that the attacker can never learn any new information above that which
they were assumed to know initially.
The attacker is assumed to be unable to read any of the program’s memory during or after
its execution. However, the programming language (see Section 4.2 later) includes an output
command: output(ℓ, 𝑒). Here ℓ denotes an output channel and 𝑒 the value being output. Certain
channels are assumed visible to the attacker. Specifically, the channels names ℓ are ordered in a
complete lattice ⊑. The attacker is assigned a security level ℓ𝐴 which defines the channels that they
can observe, namely all those ℓ for which ℓ ⊑ ℓ𝐴.
As mentioned, the security property for InsecSL is timing-sensitive. This means that the attacker
can not only observe outputs on attacker-observable channels, but also at what times they occur.
As is typical, time is measured in terms of the number of small-steps of execution in the language’s
small-step operational semantics (defined later in Section 4.6.1).
Hence, assuming that the attacker does not know the initial value of the high variable, a program
like while high > 0 do high := high− 1 done; output(ℓ𝐴, 0) is insecure since the time at which it
produces the attacker-visible output of 0 depends on information not assumed to be known to the
attacker.
Additionally, the security property targeted by InsecSL assumes an attacker who is able to
observe at each point in time (i.e. after each small-step of the semantics) the program code that is
running. This implies that e.g. when executing an if-conditions if 𝑒 then 𝑐1 else 𝑐2 where 𝑐1 ≠ 𝑐2,
that the attacker can infer some information about 𝑒 (namely whether it evaluated to true or to not),
since they will be able to tell in the subsequent execution step whether 𝑐1 or 𝑐2 is being executed.
A similar argument applies to while-loops.
While not as strong as constant-time security [Barthe et al. 2020], this kind of attacker capability
is common when reasoning about the security of cryptographic code against certain side-channel
attacks [Molnar et al. 2005]. We include it here while noting that InsecSL (and our approach) can
be easily extended to cover the stronger attacker model of constant-time security if desired (see
Section 4.7).
We define the absence of information leaks under this attacker model as follows, using English
instead of semantic notation which has not yet been introduced.
Definition 4.1 (Timing-Sensitive Noninterference). A program 𝑐 satisfies timing sensitive nonin-
terference when, for all initial states 𝜎 and 𝜎 ′ that agree on the values of variables assumed to be
known to the attacker, for all (partial) executions resulting in states 𝜏 and 𝜏 ′ after the same number
of execution steps, it is the case that the remaining program to be executed in 𝜏 and 𝜏 ′ is identical,
and that the sequences of attacker-visible outputs produced in the two executions are the same.
4.2 The Language of InsecSL
Commands 𝑐 in the language are drawn from the following grammar, where 𝑒 is a pure expression
that can mention variables 𝑥 :
𝑐 ::= skip | assume(𝑒) | 𝑥 := 𝑒 | 𝑥 := [𝑒] | [𝑒] := 𝑒 ′ | 𝑥 := alloc(𝑒) | free(𝑒) |
output(𝑒, 𝑒 ′) | 𝑐1; 𝑐2 | if 𝑒 then 𝑐1 else 𝑐2 | while 𝑒 do 𝑐
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Here [𝑒] denotes dereferencing pointer 𝑒 and e.g. in C would be written *e. The commands are
standard, except output(𝑒, 𝑒 ′). Here, 𝑒 is an expression denoting a security level ℓ (i.e. an output
channel) and 𝑒 ′ denotes the value to output at level ℓ .
As in ISL [Raad et al. 2020], commands in InsecSL carry an optional label 𝐿 that is used for
error-reporting. We denote the command 𝑐 with label 𝐿 by L : 𝑐 .
4.3 InsecSL Assertions
Assertions 𝑃 , 𝑄 of InsecSL combine standard separation logic connectives (separating conjunc-
tion “∗”, points-to “𝑒 ↦→ 𝑒 ′” and the empty heap emp) with the 𝑒𝑝 ̸↦→ operator from ISL [Raad et al.
2020], which means that pointer denoted by expression 𝑒𝑝 is known to be invalid (i.e. to not refer
to valid memory) and so dereferencing it is an error. Additionally, InsecSL assertions include the
security assertion 𝑒 :: 𝑒ℓ of SecCSL [Ernst and Murray 2019], which means that an attacker whose
security level is greater than or equal to that denoted by the expression 𝑒ℓ knows the data contained
in expression 𝑒 . This assertion is used, for instance, to specify what initial data the attacker is
assumed to know.
A key innovation of ISL to facilitate under-approximate separation logic reasoning was to
introduce the 𝑒𝑝 ̸↦→ assertion. It can be seen as the “erroneous” dual of the traditional points-to
assertion 𝑒𝑝 ↦→ 𝑒𝑣 : when the latter holds dereferencing the pointer 𝑒𝑝 is OK; however when the
former holds, it is erroneous. In a similar manner, InsecSL adds insecurity assertions as the dual
to SecCSL’s 𝑒 :: 𝑒ℓ . The InsecSL assertion 𝑒::/𝑒ℓ means that the attacker’s security level is greater
or equal to that denoted by the expression 𝑒ℓ and they do not know (all of) the data contained in
expression 𝑒 . Put another way, it means that the attacker has some uncertainty about the value
of 𝑒 . When the attacker’s level is greater or equal to that denoted by 𝑒ℓ , outputting some value 𝑒 on
channel 𝑒ℓ is OK when 𝑒 :: 𝑒ℓ holds, but is insecure when 𝑒::/𝑒ℓ is satisfiable.
All InsecSL assertions are relational [Yang 2007], meaning that they are evaluated over a pair
of states (and so their semantics, defined later in Section 4.6.2, defines a binary state relation).
InsecSL’s non-spatial assertions 𝜌 are as follows, where 𝑒 , 𝑒 ′ range over pure expressions, including
boolean propositions:
𝜌 ::= 𝑒 | 𝜌 =⇒ 𝜌 | 𝑒 :: 𝑒 ′ | 𝑒::/𝑒 ′
Then InsecSL’s assertions 𝑃,𝑄 are defined according to the following grammar:
𝑃 ::= emp | 𝜌 | 𝑒 ↦→ 𝑒 ′ | 𝑒 ̸↦→ | 𝑃 ∗𝑄 | ∃𝑥 . 𝑃 𝑥 | false | 𝑃 =⇒ 𝑄
4.4 InsecSL Judgements
Like prior incorrectness logics [O’Hearn 2019; Raad et al. 2020], InsecSL has multiple kinds of
judgements. The judgement ⊢ℓ [𝑃] 𝑐 [ok : 𝑄] means that for all pairs of final states satisfying 𝑄
we can find a pair of initial states satisfying 𝑃 under which 𝑐 can execute twice to respectively
reach the 𝑄 states, at which point both executions of 𝑐 have terminated without error, and without
leaking information to any ℓ-level attacker. It represents under-approximation of the successful
and secure execution of command 𝑐 .
InsecSL also supports two judgements for reasoning about problematic behaviour. The judge-
ment ⊢ℓ [𝑃] 𝑐 [err (L) : 𝑄] is for provably detecting errors like memory-safety violations in 𝑐 and is
akin to the error judgement of [Raad et al. 2020]’s Incorrectness Separation Logic (ISL). It says that
for all pairs of final states satisfying 𝑄 , there exists a pair of initial states satisfying 𝑃 , from which
when 𝑐 executes from each, both executions terminate at the 𝑄-states respectively, however in a
distingished abort semantic configuration, meaning that each execution has behaved erroneously.
As in ISL, the label 𝐿 recorded in the judgement is that of the erroneous program command.
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The final judgement of InsecSL is ⊢ℓ [𝑃] 𝑐 [insec(L) : 𝑄]. Rather than (ordinary) erroneous
behaviour, ⊢ℓ [𝑃] 𝑐 [insec(L) : 𝑄] captures provable insecure behaviour of command 𝑐 . Specifically,
that 𝑐 can be executed from a pair of initial states satisfying 𝑃 and in doing so leak information
to a ℓ-level attacker. More formally, for all pairs of final states satisfying 𝑄 , there exist a pair of
initial 𝑃-states from which 𝑐 can execute to reach the 𝑄-states and at this point of the execution
the ℓ-level attacker has been able to infer secret information (i.e. information that we did not assume
the attacker knew initially), either by observing an output (to some level ℓ ′ ⊑ ℓ), or because 𝑐 has
branched on a secret.
We defer formalising these meanings until presenting the soundness theorems for InsecSL in
Section 4.6.
4.5 The Rules of InsecSL
Some key rules of InsecSL are depicted in Fig. 4 (all rules are depicted in Fig. 7 in Appendix C).
The notation ⊢ℓ [𝑃] 𝑐 [𝜖 : 𝑄] is borrowed from ISL [Raad et al. 2020] and is used in many of the
rules to generalise over the three kinds of judgements: ok, err , and insec. When it appears more
than once in a rule, it should be read as meaning that the kinds of the judgements must match. For
instance, the Disj rule allows one to derive ⊢ℓ [𝑃1 ∨ 𝑃2] 𝑐 [ok : 𝑄1 ∨𝑄2], knowing ⊢ℓ [𝑃𝑖 ] 𝑐 [ok : 𝑄𝑖 ]
for all 𝑖 ∈ {1, 2}, and likewise if all three judgements are err or insec, but one cannot use it to mix
judgements of different kinds.
The rules Disj and Conseq are familiar from under-approximate relational logic (Section 3.3).
Entailment between InsecSL assertions is written 𝑃
ℓ
=⇒ 𝑄 and is defined relative to the level
of the attacker ℓ , because InsecSL assertions are evaluated relative to the attacker-level ℓ (see
Section 4.6.2). 𝑃
ℓ
=⇒ 𝑄 means that𝑄 holds whenever 𝑃 does, where both are evaluated relative to ℓ .
Many of InsecSL’s rules are familiar from ISL [Raad et al. 2020]. These include the rules Ex, Skip,
Assign, all *OK and *Err rules (except OutOK), plus the rules Alloc1 and Alloc2, IfTrue, IfFalse,
WhileTrue and WhileFalse and the separation logic frame rule Frame. These rules operate
analogously to their ISL counterparts. Thus, as SecCSL reasoning closely resembles reasoning in
a traditional concurrent separation logic [Ernst and Murray 2019], so InsecSL reasoning closely
resembles reasoning in ISL.
For instance, FreeErr detects double-free errors. LoadErr and StoreErr detect use-after-free
errors, and so on. We refer the reader to Raad et al. [2020] for further details.
The main differences between InsecSL and ISL concern the *Insec rules and the OutOK rule.
OutOK reasons about outputs in which the value being output 𝑒 is assumed to be known to the
ℓ-level attacker: 𝑒 :: ℓ . OutInsec detects the case in which an output is insecure, because the ℓ-level
attacker does not know the value 𝑒 being output: 𝑒::/ℓ . Notice that the (in)security assertions in
these rules appear in the result rather than in their presumption. One can of course use the Frame
rule to derive versions of these rules in which these conditions appear in the presumption, since
output commands modify no state. The two rules can be combined, of course, with the Disj rule to
consider both cases, in much the same way as one does with e.g. the LoadOK and LoadErr rules
in ISL.
The IfInsec and WhileInsec rules are for detecting insecure if-conditions and while-loops that
branch on a value 𝑏 whose truth is not known to the ℓ-level attacker: (𝑏 = true)::/ℓ .
4.6 Model and Soundness
4.6.1 Language Semantics. The language of InsecSL is given a standard small-step semantics,
allowing judgements to talk about partial executions (e.g. as is required for the insecurity judgement
⊢ℓ [𝑃] 𝑐 [insec(L) : 𝑄]). Semantic configurations include a stack 𝑠 that maps variables 𝑥 to values of
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⊢ℓ [𝑝 ↦→ 𝑒] [𝑝] := 𝑒 ′ [ok : 𝑝 ↦→ 𝑒 ′]
StoreOK
⊢ℓ [𝑝 ̸↦→] L : 𝑥 := [𝑝] [err (L) : 𝑝 ̸↦→]
LoadErr
⊢ℓ [𝑝 ̸↦→] L : free(𝑝) [err (L) : 𝑝 ̸↦→]
FreeErr
⊢ℓ [emp] output(ℓ ′, 𝑒) [ok : 𝑒 :: ℓ ′]
OutOK
⊢ℓ [emp] L : output(ℓ ′, 𝑒) [insec(L) : 𝑒::/ℓ ′]
OutInsec
⊢ℓ [𝑏 ∗ 𝑃] 𝑐1 [𝜖 : 𝑄]
⊢ℓ [𝑃] if 𝑏 then 𝑐1 else 𝑐2 [𝜖 : 𝑄]
IfTrue
𝑐1 ≠ 𝑐2
⊢ℓ [(𝑏 = true)::/ℓ ∗ 𝐹 ] L : if 𝑏 then 𝑐1 else 𝑐2 [insec(L) : (𝑏 = true)::/ℓ ∗ 𝐹 ]
IfInsec
⊢ℓ [𝑃] 𝑐 [𝜖 : 𝑄] mod (𝑐) ∩ fv(𝑅) = ∅




=⇒ 𝑃 ⊢ℓ [𝑃 ′] 𝑐 [𝜖 : 𝑄 ′] 𝑄
ℓ
=⇒ 𝑄 ′
⊢ℓ [𝑃] 𝑐 [𝜖 : 𝑄]
Conseq
Fig. 4. Some key rules of InsecSL (see Fig. 7 in Appendix C for the remainder). Note that since in InsecSL
pure assertions 𝑏 are logically equivalent to 𝑏 ∧ emp, 𝑏 ∗ 𝑃 in IfTrue is equivalent to 𝑏 ∧ 𝑃 .
some type Val; plus a heap ℎ, whose addresses are synonymous with the type Val of values. As
in ISL [Raad et al. 2020], the heap model differs from the partial functions of standard separation
logic. Heaps ℎ are partial functions from values, where each value 𝑥 ∈ Val in the domain dom(ℎ)
of heap ℎ can map either to a value or to the distinguished element ⊥, i.e. ℎ :: Val ⇀ Val ∪ {⊥}.
Semantic configurations are of three kinds: the configuration ⟨run “𝑐” 𝑠 ℎ⟩ represents a running
program 𝑐 with stack 𝑠 and heap ℎ; ⟨stop 𝑠 ℎ⟩ captures successful termination with final stack and
heap 𝑠 and ℎ; ⟨abort 𝑠 ℎ⟩ captures abnormal (erroneous) termination, with stack 𝑠 and heap ℎ at
the point of the error recorded in the configuration.
The semantics of the language are straightforward and largely mirror those from the prior
work [Ernst and Murray 2019; Raad et al. 2020]. They appear in Fig. 10 (in Appendix D). The small-
step semantics records information about the execution steps in the schedule 𝜎 , explained below.
For configurations 𝑘 and 𝑘 ′ and schedule 𝜎 , we write 𝑘
𝜎→ 𝑘 ′ to mean that execution transitions
from 𝑘 to 𝑘 ′ in a single step, producing schedule 𝜎 .
The schedule is a list of events, each of which is either 𝜏 , out⟨ℓ, 𝑣⟩, or allocate⟨𝑣⟩ for security
level ℓ and value 𝑣 ∈ Val. 𝜏 represents a single, non-output, non-alloc step of computation. out⟨ℓ, 𝑣⟩
records that value 𝑣 was output at security level (i.e. on the channel) ℓ , while allocate⟨𝑣⟩ records that
address 𝑣 was dynamically allocated (and is simply included as a convenience to ensure determinism
of the resulting small-step semantics with respect to the schedule 𝜎). All atomic commands execute
producing single-element schedules 𝜎 .
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𝑘 ′ to denote execution from configuration 𝑘 to 𝑘 ′ producing schedule 𝜎 in zero or
more steps, i.e. the transitive reflexive closure of the small-step semantics in which the schedules of
each consecutive step in the execution are concatenated together to form 𝜎 . Note that the length of
the resulting schedule 𝜎 corresponds exactly to the step counter (i.e. to the number of small steps
that have been executed when transitioning from 𝑘 to 𝑘 ′).
4.6.2 Assertion Semantics. The semantics of InsecSL assertions are given in Fig. 11 (in Appendix D).
Most of these are familiar and inherited from their counterparts in SecCSL [Ernst and Murray 2019].
As in SecCSL, InsecSL assertions are given a relational semantics [Yang 2007], i.e. are evaluated
against a pair of states (𝑠, ℎ), (𝑠 ′, ℎ′). We write (𝑠, ℎ) (𝑠 ′, ℎ′) ⊨ℓ 𝑃 to mean that assertion 𝑃 holds in
the pair of states (𝑠, ℎ) (𝑠 ′, ℎ′). The security level ℓ denotes the security level of the attacker (see
Section 4.1).
Implication and false are lifted in the obvious way. ∃ 𝑥 . 𝑃 𝑥 holds when a pair of values 𝑣 , 𝑣 ′ can
be found for 𝑥 in the left and right states respectively to make 𝑃 hold. Pure expressions 𝑒 are given a
boolean interpretation by testing whether they evaluate to a distinguished value true in both states.
Similarly, spatial assertions like emp, 𝑒𝑝 ↦→ 𝑒𝑣 and 𝑒𝑝 ̸↦→ essentially assert the standard separation
logic assertion semantics over both states. Separating conjunction lifts its ordinary separation logic
counterpart over pairs of states: 𝑃1 ∗ 𝑃2 holds when each heap can be partitioned into a left and
right part, so that 𝑃1 holds of the two left parts, and 𝑃2 does likewise for the two right parts.
The semantics of 𝑒 :: 𝑒ℓ remain unchanged from SecCSL, and assert that 𝑒 is known to the attacker
if the attacker is able to observe 𝑒ℓ -level outputs or, equivalently, 𝑒 is known to the attacker if the
attacker’s level is greater than or equal to that denoted by 𝑒ℓ . Recall that ℓ denotes the attacker’s
security level. Recall also from Section 2.2 we say that in a pair of states the attacker knows the
value of some expression 𝑒 , if 𝑒 evaluates to identical values in those two states. Thus 𝑒 :: 𝑒ℓ holds
between two states precisely when, if the level denoted by 𝑒ℓ is observable to the attacker ([𝑒ℓ ]𝑠 ⊑ ℓ),
the two states agree on the value of 𝑒 .
Agreement on 𝑒 between the two states formalises that the attacker knows 𝑒 . For this reason,
disagreement on 𝑒 formalises that the attacker has some uncertainty about 𝑒 . Hence, the semantics
for 𝑒::/𝑒ℓ .
4.6.3 Successful, Erroneous and Insecure Execution. As the final step towards the soundness state-
ment for InsecSL, we can now formalise what it means for a program execution to be OK (free of
insecurity and errors), erroneous, and insecure respectively. We consider insecurity first.
Definition 4.2 (Insecure Behaviour). We say that the presumption 𝑃 and result𝑄 witness insecurity
of program 𝑐 against the ℓ-level attacker when for all (final) states 𝑠 ,ℎ, 𝑠 ′,ℎ′ such that (𝑠, ℎ) (𝑠 ′, ℎ′) ⊨ℓ
𝑄 , there exist 𝑠0, ℎ0, 𝑠 ′0, ℎ
′
0, 𝜎 , 𝜎




⟨run “𝑐” 𝑠 ′0 ℎ′0⟩
𝜎′→
∗
𝑘 ′, where𝜎 and𝜎 ′ have equal lengths and the stack and heap of𝑘 are respectively 𝑠
and ℎ and likewise for 𝑘 ′, 𝑠 ′ and ℎ′, and finally:
• either the outputs in 𝜎 and 𝜎 ′ observable to the ℓ-level attacker differ, or
• 𝑘 and 𝑘 ′ both denote running configurations with distinct program commands.
For presumption 𝑃 and program 𝑐 , if there exists some satisfiable result 𝑄 for which 𝑃 and 𝑄
witness insecurity of 𝑐 (Definition 4.2), then 𝑐 does not satisfy timing-sensitive noninterference
(Definition 4.1). Specifically, there exist two executions beginning from 𝑃-states that the attacker
can distinguish, and so the program 𝑐 leaks information to the timing-sensitive ℓ-level attacker of
Section 4.1.
Erroneous and OK behaviour are defined similarly, although more straightforwardly.
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Definition 4.3 (Erroneous Behaviour). We say that the presumption 𝑃 and result 𝑄 witness er-
roneous execution of program 𝑐 against the ℓ-level attacker when for all (final) states 𝑠 , ℎ, 𝑠 ′,
ℎ′ such that (𝑠, ℎ) (𝑠 ′, ℎ′) ⊨ℓ 𝑄 , there exist 𝑠0, ℎ0, 𝑠 ′0, ℎ′0, 𝜎 , 𝜎 ′, such that (𝑠0, ℎ0) (𝑠 ′0, ℎ′0) ⊨ℓ 𝑃 ,
⟨run “𝑐” 𝑠0 ℎ0⟩
𝜎→
∗
⟨abort 𝑠 ℎ⟩, ⟨run “𝑐” 𝑠 ′0 ℎ′0⟩
𝜎′→
∗
⟨abort 𝑠 ′ ℎ′⟩, where 𝜎 and 𝜎 ′ have equal lengths
and the outputs in 𝜎 and 𝜎 ′ observable to the ℓ-level attacker are equal.
Definition 4.4 (OK (Non-Erroneous, Non-Insecure) Behaviour). We say that the presumption 𝑃 and
result 𝑄 witness OK execution of program 𝑐 against the ℓ-level attacker when for all (final) states 𝑠 ,
ℎ, 𝑠 ′, ℎ′ such that (𝑠, ℎ) (𝑠 ′, ℎ′) ⊨ℓ 𝑄 , there exist 𝑠0, ℎ0, 𝑠 ′0, ℎ′0, 𝜎 , 𝜎 ′, such that (𝑠0, ℎ0) (𝑠 ′0, ℎ′0) ⊨ℓ 𝑃 ,
⟨run “𝑐” 𝑠0 ℎ0⟩
𝜎→
∗
⟨stop 𝑠 ℎ⟩, ⟨run “𝑐” 𝑠 ′0 ℎ′0⟩
𝜎′→
∗
⟨stop 𝑠 ′ ℎ′⟩, where 𝜎 and 𝜎 ′ have equal lengths
and the outputs in 𝜎 and 𝜎 ′ observable to the ℓ-level attacker are equal.
4.6.4 Soundness. The soundness statement for InsecSL comprises three theorems: one for each of
its judgements. Each theorem states that when the corresponding type of judgement holds, then
the presumption and result of the judgement witness the corresponding type of execution. Thus,
for instance, InsecSL’s insecurity judgement ⊢ℓ [𝑃] 𝑐 [insec(L) : 𝑄] can provably detect violations
of timing-sensitive noninterference (Theorem 4.7). Like ISL, its error judgement provably detects
erroneous program behaviours (Theorem 4.6).
Theorem 4.5. If ⊢ℓ [𝑃] 𝑐 [ok : 𝑄] then 𝑃 and 𝑄 witness OK execution of 𝑐 against the ℓ-level
attacker according to Definition 4.4.
Theorem 4.6. If ⊢ℓ [𝑃] 𝑐 [err (L) : 𝑄] then 𝑃 and 𝑄 witness erroneous execution of 𝑐 against the
ℓ-level attacker according to Definition 4.3.
Theorem 4.7. If ⊢ℓ [𝑃] 𝑐 [insec(L) : 𝑄] then 𝑃 and 𝑄 witness insecure execution of 𝑐 against the
ℓ-level attacker according to Definition 4.2.
We refer the reader to our Isabelle/HOL formalisation for the details of these proofs.
4.7 Extending InsecSL to Constant-Time Security
We noted earlier in Section 4.1 that the security property and attacker model targeted by InsecSL
is weaker than that of constant-time security [Barthe et al. 2020]. InsecSL forbids a program to
explicitly output or branch on secrets. Constant-time security additionally forbids a program from
performing secret-dependent memory accesses.
Extending InsecSL to constant-time security is straightforward. We briefly sketch how. Doing so
adds additional rules for loading and storing to the heap to detect insecurity. Similarly to OutInsec,
these rules have in their result that the pointer 𝑝 being loaded from (respectively stored to) is not
known to the attacker: 𝑝::/ℓ . The existing OK rules have the converse added to their results: 𝑝 :: ℓ .
The semantics of the language (Section 4.6.1) is extended to record in the schedule 𝜎 the address of
each pointer that is loaded from and stored to, effectively making these outputs of the program. The
security property then imposes the extra requirement that in the two executions, these addresses
are identical.
Soundness then follows from a similar argument as that for the existing output rules.
5 BACK-PROPAGATING SYMBOLIC EXECUTION
Having described the logic InsecSL which underpins our approach, we now formalise back-
propagating symbolic execuction (BPSE), our approach to automate the application of InsecSL
to infer (insecurity) summaries for first-order functions. For now, we consider only leaf functions
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(i.e. ones that do not call other functions). We consider others when explaining our inter-procedural
analysis in Section 6.
Like prior symbolic execution-based approaches for automating the application of separation
logics [Calcagno et al. 2009; Raad et al. 2020] our BPSE uses bi-abduction to infer additional spatial
predicates required to successfully execute commands like loads and stores. However, its key
innovation is that in under-approximate logics like InsecSL, these inferred spatial predicates can
be propagated backwards along the execution trace that was followed up to this point. Doing so
allows them to be transformed over preceding statements that might have modified local variables
mentioned in those assertions. The program in Fig. 2 is a good example, in which BPSE infers the
needed condition p ↦→ 𝑥 in step 3 which mentions the variable p modified by the preceding
assignment statement p = arr + off.
Prior symbolic execution approaches for under-approximate logics, notably that for ISL [Raad
et al. 2020], simply attempt to propagate newly inferred assertions backwards unchanged via the
frame rule. This doesn’t work when the preceding part of the programmodifies variables mentioned
in those assertions.
To define BPSE, it helps to introduce an extra program command assume(𝑒). This command
is not a “real” command in the sense that it cannot appear in program text. Instead, it is used
to remember, during BPSE, which conditional branches have been followed along the current
execution path. As we will see, BPSE maintains a trace that records the execution path followed so
far, in which assume commands can appear. Their semantics is to evaluate the condition 𝑒 and, if 𝑒
holds to act as a no-op but otherwise execution gets stuck.
Importantly, when back-propagating we are always doing so over prior “ok” InsecSL judgements
(since symbolic execution never continues further once it has discovered erroneous or insecure
behaviour). The core of the back-propagation problem, then, is given an existing judgement ⊢ℓ
[𝑃] 𝑐 [ok : 𝑄] and some additional assertion 𝐹 that wewish to conjoinwith𝑄 , how dowe transform 𝐹
to some 𝐹 ′ such that ⊢ℓ [𝑃 ∗ 𝐹 ′] 𝑐 [ok : 𝑄 ∗ 𝐹 ] holds?
We define a procedure for doing so, called transformℓ (𝑃, 𝑐, 𝐹 , 𝐹 ′), which operates by making
a case distinction on the command 𝑐 , over which 𝐹 is being back-propagated to produce the
transformed assertion 𝐹 ′.
Definition 5.1 (Transform). For any command 𝑐 , any security level ℓ , and any assertions 𝑃 , 𝐹 and
𝐹 ′, we define transformℓ (𝑃, 𝑐, 𝐹 , 𝐹 ′) holds if and only if: exists 𝑥 , 𝑒 ,𝑀 and 𝑒𝑝 such that
(𝑐 ∈ {skip, [𝑥] := 𝑒, free(𝑒), output(𝑥, 𝑒), assume(𝑒)} ∧ 𝐹 ′ = 𝐹 ) ∨
(𝑐 = (𝑥 := alloc(𝑒)) ∧ 𝐹 ′ = (∃𝑥 . 𝐹 )) ∨
(𝑐 = (𝑥 := 𝑒) ∧ 𝐹 ′ = 𝐹 [𝑒/𝑥]) ∨
(𝑐 = (𝑥 := [𝑒𝑝 ]) ∧ 𝐹 ′ = 𝐹 [𝑒/𝑥] ∧ (𝑃
ℓ
=⇒ (𝑒𝑝 ↦→ 𝑒 ∗𝑀)))
For commands that do not modify local variables (e.g. skip, or store, or output) 𝐹 is unchanged.
Since an allocation 𝑥 := alloc(𝑒) modifies variable 𝑥 , 𝐹 must be weakened to existentially quantify
over 𝑥 : we know there exists some value for which 𝐹 holds (whatever location was returned by
the allocation command) but not which. For assignments 𝑥 := 𝑒 , 𝐹 is transformed to 𝐹 [𝑒/𝑥] as
described earlier in Section 2.3. Finally, for loads 𝑥 := [𝑒𝑝 ] we need to transform 𝐹 by replacing all
occurrences of 𝑥 with whatever value is loaded from pointer 𝑒𝑝 . Fortunately we can work out what
this value will be if 𝑃 gives us enough information to deduce that 𝑒𝑝 ↦→ 𝑒 for some 𝑒 , in which
case 𝐹 is transformed to 𝐹 [𝑒/𝑥]. Fortunately, 𝑃 will always give us this information because, recall,
we back-propagate over an “ok” judgement and in all such judgements for load commands, the
presumption necessarily specifies that the pointer being loaded from is valid.
The soundness of this transformation process follows.
Proc. ACM Program. Lang., Vol. 1, No. CONF, Article 1. Publication date: January 2018.
Incremental Vulnerability Detection 1:21
Theorem 5.2. For all commands 𝑐 , security levels ℓ and assertions 𝑃 , 𝑄 , 𝐹 and 𝐹 ′ such that
transformℓ (𝑃, 𝑐, 𝐹 , 𝐹 ′) ∧ ⊢ℓ [𝑃] 𝑐 [ok : 𝑄], we have ⊢ℓ [𝑃 ∗ 𝐹 ′] 𝑐 [ok : 𝑄 ∗ 𝐹 ].
When back-propagating some newly inferred condition 𝐹 , 𝐹 will in general need to be back-
propagated across many commands that have been executed previously, i.e. across the entire
execution path followed to this point. BPSE stores the path as a trace, which is a list of pairs (𝑐, 𝑃)
where 𝑐 is a program command and 𝑃 an InsecSL assertion. For convenience, traces are stored
in reverse order. Each element (𝑐, 𝑃) is understood to mean that command 𝑐 was executed from
symbolic state 𝑃 , i.e. 𝑃 represents the state before 𝑐 was executed. We write the empty trace []
(which represents that there has been no preceding symbolic execution), and the trace whose head
is 𝑥 and whose tail is 𝑥𝑠 as 𝑥 : 𝑥𝑠 .
Then given an assertion 𝐹 , back-propagating it over trace 𝑡𝑟 produces the transformed trace 𝑡𝑟 ′,
and operates in the expected way by successively transforming 𝐹 over each 𝑐 and conjoining the
result 𝐹 ′ with 𝑃 . We define the procedure backpropℓ (𝐹, 𝑡𝑟, 𝑡𝑟 ′) for doing this.
Definition 5.3 (Backprop). For any assertion 𝐹 , any security level ℓ , and any traces 𝑡𝑟 and 𝑡𝑟 ′
where each of them is a list of command-assertion pair, backpropℓ (𝐹, 𝑡𝑟, 𝑡𝑟 ′) holds if and only if:
𝑡𝑟 = 𝑡𝑟 ′ = [] ∨ (∃𝑐 𝑃 𝐹 𝐹 ′ 𝑡𝑟2 𝑡𝑟 ′2. 𝑡𝑟 = (𝑐, 𝑃) : 𝑡𝑟 ′ ∧ 𝑡𝑟 ′ = (𝑐, 𝑃 ∗ 𝐹 ′) : 𝑡𝑟 ′2 ∧ transformℓ (𝑃, 𝑐, 𝐹 , 𝐹 ′) ∧
backpropℓ (𝐹 ′, 𝑡𝑟2, 𝑡𝑟 ′2))
BPSE is then defined by combining back-propagation with symbolic execution in the style of
ISL [Raad et al. 2020]. To do so, we define a judgement symexℓ (𝑡𝑟, 𝐽𝑄, 𝑐, 𝑡𝑟 ′, 𝐽𝑄 ′). Here 𝑐 is a
command, 𝑡𝑟 and 𝑡𝑟 ′ are traces, while 𝐽𝑄 and 𝐽𝑄 ′ are judgement post assertions, i.e. have one of the
following forms each for some assertion𝑄 : ok : 𝑄 , err : 𝑄 , or insec : 𝑄 . Trace 𝑡𝑟 and 𝐽𝑄 represent the
current state of symbolic execution before command 𝑐 is executed, in the sense that 𝑡𝑟 is the trace
followed up to this point and 𝐽𝑄 represents the symbolic state immediately before 𝑐 is executed.
Executing 𝑐 necessarily extends the trace (possibly also transforming it via back-propagation),
yielding an updated trace 𝑡𝑟 ′ and a new post assertion 𝐽𝑄 ′.
Some key symbolic execution rules for atomic commands appear in Fig. 5. The remaining
symbolic execution rules appear in Fig. 8 and Fig. 9 in Appendix C. Recall that back-propagating
pure assertions is optional. While our Isabelle formalisation covers both options, the rules we
present here cover the default case in which one does not want to back-propagate pure assertions.
Before explaining these rules, we first state the top-level soundness theorem for BPSE. Put simply,
this theorem says that BPSE derives valid InsecSL judgements.
Theorem 5.4. For all commands 𝑐 , security levels ℓ , post-assertions 𝐽𝑄 and 𝐽𝑄 ′ and all traces 𝑡𝑟 ,
such that symexℓ ( [], 𝐽𝑄, 𝑐, 𝑡𝑟, 𝐽𝑄 ′) holds, we have 𝑡𝑟 is not empty. Furthermore, letting (𝑐, 𝑃) denote
the last element of 𝑡𝑟 , we have ⊢ℓ [𝑃] 𝑐 [𝐽𝑄 ′].
The structural rules in Fig. 9 mirror their counterparts from prior symbolic execution methods for
automating separation logics. The exceptions are the additional rules SEIfInsec and SEWhileInsec
to detect leaks due to branching on secrets.
Of the rules for atomic commands in Fig. 5, the most interesting are those that infer new
spatial predicates that must be back-propagated. A good example is the SELoad rule. Given the
presumption 𝑃 , to symbolically execute the load 𝑥 := [𝑝], we need to know that, for some 𝑒
and some frame assertion 𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑒 , 𝑝 ↦→ 𝑒 ∗ 𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑒 entails 𝑃 . (Recall that the entailment is the
reverse of the usual direction from over-approximate reasoning due to the reversed nature of the
consequence rule in under-approximate logics.) However 𝑃 might not say anything about the part
of the heap to which 𝑝 points. In this case, the rule infers an appropriate assertion𝑀 , by solving
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𝑐 = (output(𝑒𝑙, 𝑒))
symexℓ (𝑡𝑟, [ok : 𝑃], L : 𝑐, (L : 𝑐, 𝑃) : 𝑡𝑟, [insec(L) : 𝑃 ∗ 𝑒::/𝑒𝑙])
SEOutInsec
backpropℓ (𝑀, 𝑡𝑟, 𝑡𝑟 ′) 𝑥 ′ ∉ fv(𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑒) 𝑝 ↦→ 𝑒 ∗ 𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑒
ℓ
=⇒ 𝑃 ∗𝑀
symexℓ (𝑡𝑟, [ok : 𝑃], 𝑥 := [𝑝], (𝑥 := [𝑝], 𝑃 ∗𝑀) : 𝑡𝑟 ′, [ok : 𝑥 = 𝑒 [𝑥 ′/𝑥] ∗ (𝑝 ↦→ 𝑒 ∗ 𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑒) [𝑥 ′/𝑥]])
SELoad
backpropℓ (𝑀, 𝑡𝑟, 𝑡𝑟 ′) 𝑝 ̸↦→ ∗𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑒
ℓ
=⇒ 𝑃 ∗𝑀
symexℓ (𝑡𝑟, [ok : 𝑃], L : [𝑝] := 𝑒 ′, (L : [𝑝] := 𝑒 ′, 𝑃 ∗𝑀) : 𝑡𝑟 ′, [err (L) : 𝑝 ̸↦→ ∗𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑒])
SEStoreErr
Fig. 5. Some BPSE rules for atomic commands. Other rules appear in Fig. 8 and Fig. 9 in Appendix C.
the biabduction [Calcagno et al. 2009] problem: 𝑝 ↦→ 𝑒∗?𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑒 ℓ=⇒ 𝑃∗?𝑀 , which yields assertions
𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑒 and𝑀 to make this entailment hold.𝑀 must then be back-propagated through the trace 𝑡𝑟 ,
yielding the updated trace 𝑡𝑟 ′. The presumption recorded in the trace, at the point before this load
is executed, is therefore 𝑃 ∗𝑀 . After executing the load, the frame 𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑒 is preserved, plus we
know that 𝑥 is now equal to 𝑒’s original value, while for the original values of 𝑝 and 𝑒 , 𝑝 ↦→ 𝑒 still
holds. The fresh variable 𝑥 ′ is introduced to represent the initial value of 𝑥 before the load, and we
obtain the original values of the expressions 𝑝 and 𝑒 via substitution in the usual way.
Note that this rule generates the 𝑃∗𝑀 that precedes the load from 𝑝 . Recall that such presumptions
must have sufficient information to remember the value 𝑒 to which 𝑝 points, in order to enable
subsequent back-propagation over them (see Definition 5.1). Thus, we require that the biabduction
solver, when generating the 𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑒 and 𝑀 to solve the entailment 𝑝 ↦→ 𝑒 ∗ 𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑒 ℓ=⇒ 𝑃 ∗𝑀 , to
ensure that𝑀 does not lose the information that 𝑝 ↦→ 𝑒 , i.e. we require for the𝑀 generated that
there exists some 𝐹 such that 𝑃 ∗𝑀 ℓ=⇒ 𝑝 ↦→ 𝑒 ∗ 𝐹 . Underflow’s implementation of this inference
indeed satisfies this constraint, since it operates by simply searching the current symbolic state for
any assertion of the form 𝑝 ↦→ _ (since 𝑒 is free in the SELoad rule); if none is found it invents a
fresh variable 𝑦 and conjoins the assertion 𝑝 ↦→ 𝑦 to the state and back-propagates it.
The BPSE process described can be applied to the body of a function to infer summaries that
describe its internal behaviour. We briefly describe how to transform such summaries to have them
describe the function’s external behaviour. Consider the trivial function void func(int x) x = x
+ 1; that uselessly increments its argument x. Its internal behaviour is captured by the judgement
⊢ℓ [emp] x = x + 1 [ok : x = 𝑥 ′ + 1]. Here the SEAssign rule has introduced the logical variable 𝑥 ′
to refer in the result to x’s initial value. Recall from Section 2.3 that in summaries that describe a
function’s external behaviour, mentions of its formal parameters in the result assertion refer to
the initial values of those variables. Thus to transform the summary above so that it talks about
func()’s external behaviour, Underflow remembers the first logical variable 𝑥 ′ (if any) that was
introduced to represent the initial value of each formal parameter x). It introduces fresh logical
variables 𝑥2 to capture the final values of each formal parameter x. It then renames all occurrences
of each formal parameter x in the result to 𝑥2. For each logical variable 𝑥 ′ introduced to capture
the initial value of a formal parameter x, it renames in the result all occurrences of 𝑥 ′ back to x.
Finally, it existentially quantifies over all variables that are not formal parameters. Doing so yields
the external summary: ⊢ℓ [emp] func(x) [ok : ∃𝑥2 .𝑥2 = x + 1] which can of course be simplified
to the logically equivalent ⊢ℓ [emp] func(x) [ok : emp].
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6 INTER-PROCEDURAL ANALYSIS
Having inferred a set of summaries for a function, how can we use those summaries in the
analysis of its callers? In particular, suppose function 𝑓 () calls function 𝑔() and we have the
summary [𝑃𝑔] 𝑔() [𝑄𝑔]. (For simplicity, we ignore parameter passing which is an orthogonal
concern easily handled by substituion as usual.) Suppose we are symbolically executing 𝑓 () and that
we encounter a call to 𝑔() and that, without loss of generality, symbolic execution has derived the
InsecSL assertion 𝑆 that describes the internal state of 𝑓 () at the call-site to 𝑔(). In traditional over-
approximate reasoning we would need to prove that 𝑆 entails 𝑃𝑔. However in under-approximate
logics like InsecSL, recall that the consequence rule is reversed and, hence, in general the entailment
must be proved in the opposite direction, i.e. one must prove that 𝑃𝑔 entails 𝑆 .
Fortunately, since InsecSL is a separation logic it inherits the frame rule. This rule allows parts
of 𝑆 not relevant to 𝑃𝑔 to be factored out. Specifically, rather than proving that 𝑃𝑔 entails the entirety
of 𝑆 , the frame rule allows us to break up 𝑆 into two parts 𝑅 and 𝐹 such that 𝑆 = 𝑅 ∗ 𝐹 , for which
we can prove that 𝑃𝑔 entails just 𝑅. Symbolic execution then proceeds by replacing 𝑅 in 𝑆 with 𝑄𝑔,
yielding the updated symbolic state 𝑄𝑔 ∗ 𝐹 in which the frame 𝐹 has been preserved.
Formally, this is justified by the following rule of under-approximate separation logics. Here we
assume that command 𝑔 modifies no local variables mentioned in 𝐹 , which is trivially true when it
is a function call since, recall from Section 2.3, called functions cannot modify their caller’s stack:
[𝑃𝑔] 𝑔 [𝑄𝑔] 𝑃𝑔 ∗ 𝐹 =⇒ 𝑆
[𝑆] 𝑔 [𝑄𝑔 ∗ 𝐹 ]
However, it turns out we don’t even need to prove the (reversed from usual) entailment that 𝑃𝑔
entails some 𝑅. To see why, first observe that via the consequence rule, any pure assertions in 𝑃𝑔
can simply be conjoined with 𝑆 ; if the resulting state is satisfiable, the pure part of the entailment
must hold. Then, the remaining spatial part of 𝑃𝑔 necessarily contains only two kinds of spatial
assertions, _ ↦→ _ and _ ̸↦→, because (observe) our BPSE ensures that inferred presumptions 𝑃𝑔 are
always a conjunction of _ ↦→ _ and _ ̸↦→ assertions. It also ensures that 𝑆 is a conjunction of these
same two kinds of assertions, plus additional pure assertions only. Thus we can split 𝑆 into an 𝑅
and 𝐹 for which the spatial part of 𝑃𝑔 entails 𝑅 simply by looking only at the spatial assertions in 𝑆
and finding that subset 𝑅 for which each assertion in 𝑃𝑔 entails a corresponding assertion in 𝑅 (𝐹 is
then the remainder of 𝑆).
Even better, the two kinds of spatial assertions 𝑒𝑝 ↦→ 𝑒𝑣 and 𝑒𝑝 ̸↦→ have the property that if 𝑃𝑖
and 𝑃 𝑗 are each a single assertion of one of these kinds, and if 𝑃𝑖 entails 𝑃 𝑗 , then they are both of
the same kind (both are of the form _ ↦→ _ or both are of the form _ ̸↦→) and, moreover, 𝑃 𝑗 also
entails 𝑃𝑖 . Therefore we can reverse the direction of the entailment check for each spatial assertion
in 𝑆 , i.e. find that subset 𝑅 of the spatial assertions in 𝑆 for which each assertion in 𝑅 entails a
corresponding spatial assertion in 𝑃𝑔, to cover all such assertions in 𝑃𝑔. (Indeed our BPSE makes
use of this same trick when implementing the entailment checks of e.g. the SELoad rule.)
If 𝑆 lacks a spatial assertion needed to entail some part of 𝑃𝑔 we can simply infer and back-
propagate extra spatial assertions to augment 𝑆 , e.g. as for the SELoad rule of BPSE.
7 IMPLEMENTATION
This design is implemented in the proof-of-concept tool Underflow, which we built by modifying
an existing verifier for the over-approximate security separation logic SecCSL [Ernst and Murray
2019]. Specifically, Underflow implements the bottom-up inter-procedural analysis described in
Section 2.4 and Section 6, via BPSE as described in Section 2.3 and Section 5.
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Underflow unrolls loops to a fixed, user-supplied bound, which essentially limits the number
of times, for each loop, it is willing to apply the SEWhileTrue rule of Fig. 9.
Applying Underflow to the auction case study described in Section 2.1 and telling it to unroll
loops twice, yields 5 summaries for the top-level run_auction() function (in addition to vari-
ous summaries for the other functions, including those mentioned earlier in Section 2): four “ok”
summaries plus a single insecurity summary that describes how Barry’s auction server leaks infor-
mation, which is depicted in Fig. 12 (in Appendix E) in Underflow’s ASCII notation. Underflow
does not currently attempt to simplify the generated summaries and, hence, this one contains a lot
of extraneous detail. However observe that the presumption is true (Underflow’s equivalent of
emp), and the result contains ((nqt335 > nqt239) :!: attacker) which, using mathematical
notation we might write nqt1335 > nqt239::/ℓ𝐴 since “:!:” is Underflow’s ASCII rendering of ::/ ,
and attacker denotes the attacker’s security level, which we wrote earlier as ℓ𝐴. Here the two nqt
variables refer to values produced by calls to get_bid() (c.f. its “ok” summary from Section 2.4).
We have also applied Underflow to various other case studies. To demonstrate its effectiveness
to detect also memory-safety issues, we applied it to the “push back” case study from [Raad et al.
2020]. It is able to correctly infer summaries for the functions of this example, and detect the
use-after-free vulnerability it describes, via its inter-procedural analysis.
Other case studies to which we have applied Underflow include the core of a (simulated)
differentially private location service, and various other pieces of C code from the SecC repository
(whose frontend Underflow shares). As well as various small C functions written to test its ability
to carry out under-approximate reasoning. In total the C code to which Underflow has been
applied constitutes ∼ 11, 000 lines.
Underflow’s current design eagerly applies all possible symbolic execution rules at all times,
thereby generating for each function the greatest number of summaries that it can, but also causing
maximum path explosion. To understand how this design choice impacts scalability, we conducted a
brief experiment to determine the impact of unrolling the loop in run_auction()with successively
higher bounds. As one should expect, increasing the bound by one effectively doubles the number
of execution paths Underflow explores and, hence, the number of summaries it infers, leading to
a perfectly exponential (𝑅2 = 0.9988) growth rate in analysis time for this function.
Hence, an obvious avenue for future work will involve implementing search heuristics to better
guide Underflow towards likely vulnerabilities. Here we will be able to borrow much prior work
that has tackled the path-explosion problem in traditional symbolic executors like KLEE [Cadar
et al. 2008]. We also intend to investigate AI search techniques for this purpose, which have recently
shown promise in the context of binary sybmolic execution [Liu et al. 2020].
Another clear avenue for future work is to investigate methods to generate counter-examples from
(insecurity) summaries, like that in Fig. 12 (Appendix E). Doing so would greatly ease developers
whose task it is to fix a security vulnerability encoded in such a logical summary. The normal form
proposed for such summaries in Section 2.3 suggests a fruitful procedure for doing so, based on
constraint solving, fuzzing and program synthesis, that we intend to investigate.
8 RELATEDWORK AND CONCLUSION
We presented the first compositional, incremental method for detecting memory-safety and infor-
mation leakage vulnerabilities, free of false alarms. Existing techniques for the automatic discovery
of these types of vulnerabilities include relational symbolic execution [Daniel et al. 2020, 2021; Farina
et al. 2019, 2021] and differential fuzzing [Nilizadeh et al. 2019], which generalise the traditional
vulnerability discovery techniques of symbolic execution and fuzzing respectively to allow them to
compare program executions. Recent work also explores hybrid approaches that combine these
techniques [Noller et al. 2020]. These approaches are neither compositional nor incremental.
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Over-Approximate Under-Approximate
Non-Local, Correctness Hoare Logic [Hoare 1969] Incorrectness Logic [O’Hearn
2019]
Local, Correctness Separation Logic [Reynolds
2002]
Incorrectness Separation Logic
(ISL) [Raad et al. 2020]
Non-Local, Relational Relational Hoare
Logic [Benton 2004]
Under-Approximate
Relational Logic (Section 3.3)
Local, Correctness and
Security




Table 1. The main logics mentioned in this paper. Bold font indicates new logics that we presented.
This kind of compositionality is common, however, to formal program logics (and type systems)
used to prove the absence of information leaks [Broberg and Sands 2010; Ernst and Murray 2019;
Murray et al. 2018; Myers 1999], as well as to static analysis techniques for the same purpose [Rafns-
son et al. 2016]. Unfortunately, because they are necessarily over-approximate, these techniques
may suffer from false alarms, unlike our under-approximate approach.
We have shown how under-approximate relational logics can be used to (compositionally)
detect violations of relational properties, in particular information leaks, but also memory-safety
errors. The power of under-approximate logics for provably detecting bugs was recently explained
by O’Hearn [2019]. He extended the previous Reverse Hoare Logic of De Vries and Koutavas [2011],
so that the semantics explicitly tracks (assertion) failures, producing an Incorrectness Logic. Like
our under-approximate relational logic for IMP, Incorrectness Logic is both sound and complete.
O’Hearn’s Incorrectness Logic [O’Hearn 2019] was recently extended to produce the first In-
correctness Separation Logic [Raad et al. 2020] (ISL), which supports local reasoning about the
presence of memory-safety violations and other violations of safety properties. Our InsecSL can
be seen as the security analogue of ISL, in a similar manner as Ernst and Murray [2019]’s Security
Concurrent Separation Logic might be called the security analogue of traditional Concurrent Sepa-
ration Logic [O’Hearn 2004]. Like we did for InsecSL, Raad et al. [2020] proved ISL sound but did
not consider completeness. Table 1 summarises the relationships between the logics mentioned in
this paper. New logics that we presented are shown in bold font.
Just as each of our relational logics can be seen as the under-approximate analogues of prior over-
approximate relational logics, our decomposition result (Section 3.2) is also the under-approximate
analogue of Beringer’s decomposition result for over-approximate relational logic [Beringer 2011].
Our Back-Propagating Symbolic Execution extends the prior symbolic execution method of
Raad et al. [2020] for ISL in order to back-propagate inferred spatial assertions over prior program
statements that might modify variables referred to in those assertions. Doing so allows it to infer
summaries for functions like example() of Fig. 2, which we believe is outside the scope of what
the symbolic execution rules of Raad et al. [2020] can handle. Specifically Raad et al. [2020] use
only the frame rule to attempt to back-propagate inferred spatial assertions, meaning that they
have no way to transform such assertions over prior program statements.
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We showed how to extend BPSE to an inter-procedural analysis, which our proof-of-concept tool
Underflow implements to detect information leaks andmemory-safety errors across C applications.
To our knowledge, it is the first reported inter-procedural analysis baseed on an under-approximate
program logic of any kind. Both it, and BPSE, generalise to other under-approximate logics beyond
our InsecSL.
Our under-approximate relational logic for IMP demonstrates that these ideas should also be
applicable to the incremental detection of other relational property violations, like sensitivity,
privacy, and determinism to name a few, by adapting InsecSL appropriately. Having layed the
foundations in this paper, we leave such investigation for future work.
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A SECURE CODE
The following code computes the maximum of the bids stored in a and b and updates a to refer to
the maximum. It does so in a secure fashion to avoid leaking information about which bid was the
maximum.
void idqt_max(idqt *a, idqt *b){
int aid = a->id;
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int aqt = a->qt;
int bid = b->id;
int bqt = b->qt;
int t = (aqt >= bqt);
int rid = t * aid + (1 - t) * bid;





B USING THE UNDER-APPROXIMATE RELATIONAL LOGIC FOR IMP
In this appendix, we briefly show how our under-approximate relational logic for IMP (Section 3.3)
can be used to detect violations of a certain flavour of noninterference (i.e. certain kinds of infor-
mation leaks) in IMP programs. This demonstration serves as a proof that the logic is not useless;
as opposed to a demonstration of its utility since, as we stated in Section 3 it is designed as a
proof-of-concept, not for practical reasoning.
B.1 Deriving Proof Rules via Soundness and Completeness
Section 3.1 implies that under-approximate relational logics can be used to prove violations of
relational properties. Indeed, since our logic for IMP is complete, it should be able to prove all such
violations when they exist. Since it is sound, all such proofs represent real violations.
However, while the logic is complete, its rules on their own are inconvenient for reasoning about
common relational properties. Indeed, often when reasoning in relational logics one is reasoning
about two very similar programs 𝑐 and 𝑐 ′. For instance, when proving noninterference [Goguen
and Meseguer 1982] 𝑐 and 𝑐 ′ might be identical, differing only when the program branches on
secret data [Murray et al. 2012]. When proving refinement from an abstract program 𝑐 to a concrete
program 𝑐 ′, the two may often have similar structure [Benton 2004; Cock et al. 2008]. Hence for
the logic to be usable one can derive proof rules for reasoning about about similar programs. These
rules are the under-approximate counterparts to familiar rules from over-approximate relational
logics.
For instance, the following rule is typical of relational logics (both over- and under-approximate)
for decomposing matched sequential composition.
⊢ [𝑅] 𝑐, 𝑐 ′ [𝑆] ⊢ [𝑆] 𝑑, 𝑑 ′ [𝑇 ]
⊢ [𝑅] (𝑐; 𝑑), (𝑐 ′; 𝑑 ′) [𝑇 ]
Seq-Matched
Rather than appealing to the rules of Fig. 3, this rule is simpler to derive from the corresponding
property on under-approximate relational validity. In particular, it is straightforward to prove from
Definition 3.2 and the big-step semantics of IMP that when ⊨ [𝑅] 𝑐, 𝑐 ′ [𝑆] and ⊨ [𝑆] 𝑑, 𝑑 ′ [𝑇 ]
hold, then ⊨ [𝑅] (𝑐; 𝑑), (𝑐 ′; 𝑑 ′) [𝑇 ] follows. The proof rule above is then a trivial consequence of
soundness and completeness.
Other such rules that we have also proved by appealing to corresponding properties of under-
approximate relational validity with soundness and completeness include the following one for
reasoning about matched while-loops.
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Back-Var-Matched
∀ 𝑛. ⊢ [𝑅(𝑛) ∧ 𝑏1 ∧ 𝑏 ′2] 𝑐, 𝑐 ′ [𝑅(𝑛 + 1)] ⊢ [∃ 𝑛. 𝑅(𝑛)] while 𝑏 do 𝑐, while 𝑏 ′ do 𝑐 ′ [𝑆]
⊢ [𝑅(0)] while 𝑏 do 𝑐, while 𝑏 ′ do 𝑐 ′ [𝑆]
B.2 Derived Proof Rules
Other rules for matched programs are more easily derived by direct appeal to existing proof rules.
For instance, the following rule for matched assignments can be derived straightforwardly from
Assign and Sym.
⊢ [𝑅] 𝑥 := 𝑒, 𝑥 ′ := 𝑒 ′ [𝑅 [𝑥 := 𝑒] [𝑥 ′ := 𝑒 ′]]Assign-Matched
Similarly the following rule follows from Back-Var-Matched above, with WhileFalse and Sym.
∀ 𝑛. ⊢ [𝑅(𝑛) ∧ 𝑏1 ∧ 𝑏 ′2] 𝑐, 𝑐 ′ [𝑅(𝑛 + 1)]
⊢ [𝑅(0)] while 𝑏 do 𝑐, while 𝑏 ′ do 𝑐 ′ [∃ 𝑛. 𝑅(𝑛) ∧ ¬𝑏1 ∧ ¬𝑏 ′2]
Back-Var-Matched2
It is useful for reasoning past two matched loops (rather than for detecting violations of relational
validity within their bodies) and is an almost direct relational analogue of the backwards variant
rule from O’Hearn [2019].
B.3 Termination-Insensitive Noninterference Examples
With these, and similar, proof rules in hand, we now briefly demonstrate how our logic for IMP can
be used to prove violations of a specific relational property, namely timing-insensitive noninterfer-
ence [Goguen and Meseguer 1982; Sabelfeld and Myers 2003].
Termination-insensitive noninterference is a security property that considers an attacker who is
unable to observe whether the program terminates or not, nor how long the program takes to run,
but merely can observe the final values of certain public variables. The attacker is assumed to know
the program being executed and the initial values of these same public variables. Noninterference
then requires that the attacker is unable to learn any information other than that contained in the
initial values of the public variables, by observing the final values of those public variables. In other
words, the initial values of the non-public variables are not allowed to influence the final values of
the public variables.
By convention, we call a public variable “low”. For this paper, we let the relation L denote when
two states agree on the values of their low variables. Then we can define termination-insensitive
noninterference as follows, for the deterministic language IMP. This definition simply requires that
each pair of terminating exeutions beginning from L-states much terminate in L-states.
Definition B.1 (Termination-Insensitive Noninterference). Aprogram 𝑐 satisfies termination-insensitive
noninterference when, for all initial states 𝑠 and 𝑠 ′ such that L(𝑠, 𝑠 ′), and all final states 𝑡 and 𝑡 ′ such
that (𝑐, 𝑠) ⇒ 𝑡 and (𝑐, 𝑠 ′) ⇒ 𝑡 ′, it is the case that L(𝑡, 𝑡 ′).
Observe that this definition is an instance of over-approximate relational validity (Definition 3.3)
in which the pre- and psot-relations are both instantiated with L. Thus, via Proposition 3.4, a
program does not satisfy timing-insensitive noninterference if and only if there exists some non-
empty relation 𝑆 ′, for which
𝑆 ′ =⇒ ¬L and ⊨ [L] 𝑐, 𝑐 [𝑆 ′]
Thus we will show how our logic can be used to find such 𝑆 ′.
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1 if x > 0
2 low := 1
3 else
4 low := 0
1 x := 0;
2 while n > 0 do
3 x := x + n;
4 n := y ;
5 if x = 2000000
6 low := high
7 else
8 skip
1 x := 0;
2 while x < 4000000 do
3 x := x + 1;
4 if x = 2000000
5 low := high
6 else
7 skip
Fig. 6. Three insecure programs (some inspired from O’Hearn [2019]).
We consider three very simple programs, depicted in Fig. 6. In each of these programs there is
only one public variable, called low. Thus we define L as follows:
L(𝑠, 𝑠 ′) def= (𝑠 (low) = 𝑠 ′(low))
The left program in Fig. 6 is trivially insecure because the variable x is not public, yet the final
value of the public variable low reveals whether x is positive. This security violation is demonstrated
straightforwardly by using a derived proof rule (omitted for brevity) for matching if-statements
that follows the then-branch of the first and the else-branch of the second, and then by applying
the matched assignment rule Assign-Matched.
The middle program of Fig. 6 is also insecure, because it has a feasible path on which the value
of the non-public variable high is assigned to the public variable low. It is inspired by the client0
example of O’Hearn [2019]. To prove it insecure, we first use the consequence rule to strengthen
the pre-relation to one that ensures that the values of the high variable in both states are distinct.
We use the matched assignment and sequencing rules, Assign-Matched and Seq-Matched. Then
we apply some derived proof rules (omitted) for matched while-loops that (via the disjunction
rule Disj) consider both the case in which both loops terminate immediately (ensuring x = 0)
and the case in which both execute just once (ensuring x > 0). Taking the disjunction gives the
post-relation for the loops that x ≥ 0 in both states, which is of course the pre-relation for the
following if-statement. The rule of consequence allows this pre-relation to be strengthened to
x = 2000000 in both states, from which a derived rule (omitted) for matching if-statements is applied
that explores both then-branches, observing the insecurity.
The rightmost example of Fig. 6 is insecure because, like the middle program, it has a feasible
path in which high is assigned to low. The example is designed to make full use of the rule Back-
Var-Matched. After strengthening the pre-relation as in the middle example, this rule is applied
with the backwards-variant relation 𝑅(𝑛) instantiated to require that in both states x = 𝑛 and
0 ≤ x < 2000000. This effectively reasons over both loops up to the critical iteration in which x will
be incremented to become 2000000. At this point, we apply a derived rule for matching while loops
similar toWhileTrue that unfolds both for one iteration. This allows witnessing the insecurity. We
then need to reason over the remainder of the loops to reach the termination of both executions.
This is done using the Back-Var-Matched2 rule, with 𝑅(𝑛) instantiated this time to require that
in both states x = 2000000 + 𝑛 and 2000000 ≤ x ≤ 4000000 and, critically, that low = high in both
states (ensuring that the security violation is not undone during these subsequent iterations).
C RULES
Fig. 3 contains the rules of InsecSL, while Fig. 8 and Fig. 9 show the symbolic execution rules for
BPSE that automate the application of InsecSL.
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⊢ℓ [𝑃] skip [ok : 𝑃]
Skip
⊢ℓ [𝑥 = 𝑥 ′] 𝑥 := 𝑒 [ok : 𝑥 = 𝑒 [𝑥 ′/𝑥]]
Assign
⊢ℓ [𝑥 = 𝑥 ′ ∗ 𝑝 ↦→ 𝑒] 𝑥 := [𝑝] [ok : 𝑥 = 𝑒 [𝑥 ′/𝑥] ∗ 𝑝 ↦→ 𝑒 [𝑥 ′/𝑥]]
LoadOK
⊢ℓ [𝑝 ̸↦→] L : 𝑥 := [𝑝] [err (L) : 𝑝 ̸↦→]
LoadErr
⊢ℓ [𝑝 ↦→ 𝑒] [𝑝] := 𝑒 ′ [ok : 𝑝 ↦→ 𝑒 ′]
StoreOK
⊢ℓ [𝑝 ̸↦→] L : [𝑝] := 𝑒 [err (L) : 𝑝 ̸↦→]
StoreErr
⊢ℓ [emp] 𝑥 := alloc(𝑒) [ok : 𝑥 ↦→ 𝑒]
Alloc1
⊢ℓ [𝑝 ̸↦→] 𝑥 := alloc(𝑒) [ok : 𝑥 = 𝑝 ∗ 𝑝 ↦→ 𝑒]
Alloc2
⊢ℓ [𝑝 ↦→ 𝑒] free(𝑝) [ok : 𝑝 ̸↦→]
FreeOK
⊢ℓ [𝑝 ̸↦→] L : free(𝑝) [err (L) : 𝑝 ̸↦→]
FreeErr
⊢ℓ [emp] output(ℓ ′, 𝑒) [ok : 𝑒 :: ℓ ′]
OutOK
⊢ℓ [emp] L : output(ℓ ′, 𝑒) [insec(L) : 𝑒::/ℓ ′]
OutInsec
⊢ℓ [𝑏 ∗ 𝑃] 𝑐1 [𝜖 : 𝑄]
⊢ℓ [𝑃] if 𝑏 𝑐1 else 𝑐2 [𝜖 : 𝑄]
IfTrue
⊢ℓ [¬𝑏 ∗ 𝑃] 𝑐2 [𝜖 : 𝑄]
⊢ℓ [𝑃] if 𝑏 𝑐1 else 𝑐2 [𝜖 : 𝑄]
IfFalse
𝑐1 ≠ 𝑐2
⊢ℓ [(𝑏 = true)::/ℓ ∗ 𝐹 ] L : if 𝑏 𝑐1 else 𝑐2 [insec(L) : (𝑏 = true)::/ℓ ∗ 𝐹 ]
IfInsec
⊢ℓ [𝑏 ∗ 𝑃] 𝑐; while 𝑏 do 𝑐 [𝜖 : 𝑄]
⊢ℓ [𝑃] while 𝑏 do 𝑐 [𝜖 : 𝑄]
WhileTrue
⊢ℓ [¬𝑏 ∗ 𝐹 ] while 𝑏 do 𝑐 [ok : ¬𝑏 ∗ 𝐹 ]
WhileFalse
⊢ℓ [(𝑏 = true)::/ℓ ∗ 𝐹 ] L : while 𝑏 do 𝑐 [insec(L) : (𝑏 = true)::/ℓ ∗ 𝐹 ]
WhileInsec
⊢ℓ [𝑃] 𝑐1 [ok : 𝑄] ⊢ℓ [𝑄] 𝑐2 [𝜖 : 𝑅]
⊢ℓ [𝑃] 𝑐1; 𝑐2 [𝜖 : 𝑅]
SeqOK
⊢ℓ [𝑃] 𝑐1 [err (L) : 𝑄]
⊢ℓ [𝑃] 𝑐1; 𝑐2 [err (L) : 𝑄]
SeqErr
⊢ℓ [𝑃] 𝑐1 [insec(L) : 𝑄]
⊢ℓ [𝑃] 𝑐1; 𝑐2 [insec(L) : 𝑄]
SeqInsec
⊢ℓ [𝑃] 𝑐 [𝜖 : 𝑄] mod (𝑐) ∩ fv(𝑅) = ∅




=⇒ 𝑃 ⊢ℓ [𝑃 ′] 𝑐 [𝜖 : 𝑄 ′] 𝑄
ℓ
=⇒ 𝑄 ′
⊢ℓ [𝑃] 𝑐 [𝜖 : 𝑄]
Conseq
⊢ℓ [𝑃1] 𝑐 [𝜖 : 𝑄1] ⊢ℓ [𝑃2] 𝑐 [𝜖 : 𝑄2]
⊢ℓ [𝑃1 ∨ 𝑃2] 𝑐 [𝜖 : 𝑄1 ∨𝑄2]
Disj
⊢ℓ [𝑃] 𝑐 [𝜖 : 𝑄] 𝑥 ∉ fv(𝑐)
⊢ℓ [∃𝑥 . 𝑃 𝑥] 𝑐 [𝜖 : ∃ 𝑥 . 𝑄 𝑥]
Ex
Fig. 7. The rules of InsecSL.
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symexℓ (𝑡𝑟, [ok : 𝑃], skip, (skip, 𝑃) : 𝑡𝑟, [ok : 𝑃])
SESkip
symexℓ (𝑡𝑟, [ok : 𝑃], assume(𝑏), (assume(𝑏), 𝑃) : 𝑡𝑟, [ok : 𝑃 ∗ 𝑏])
SEAsm
symexℓ (𝑡𝑟, [ok : 𝑃], output(𝑒𝑙, 𝑒), (output(𝑒𝑙, 𝑒), 𝑃) : 𝑡𝑟, [ok : 𝑃 ∗ 𝑒 :: 𝑒𝑙])
SEOut
𝑐 = (output(𝑒𝑙, 𝑒))
symexℓ (𝑡𝑟, [ok : 𝑃], L : 𝑐, (L : 𝑐, 𝑃) : 𝑡𝑟, [insec(L) : 𝑃 ∗ 𝑒::/𝑒𝑙])
SEOutInsec
𝑥 ′ ∉ fv(𝑃)
symexℓ (𝑡𝑟, [ok : 𝑃], 𝑥 := 𝑒, (𝑥 := 𝑒, 𝑃) : 𝑡𝑟, [ok : 𝑃 [𝑥 ′/𝑥] ∗ 𝑥 = 𝑒 [𝑥 ′/𝑥]])
SEAssign
𝑥 ′ ∉ fv(𝑃)
symexℓ (𝑡𝑟, [ok : 𝑃], 𝑥 := alloc(𝑒), (𝑥 := alloc(𝑒), 𝑃) : 𝑡𝑟, [ok : 𝑃 [𝑥 ′/𝑥] ∗ 𝑥 ↦→ 𝑒 [𝑥 ′/𝑥]])
SEAlloc
backpropℓ (𝑀, 𝑡𝑟, 𝑡𝑟 ′) 𝑥 ′ ∉ fv(𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑒) 𝑝 ↦→ 𝑒 ∗ 𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑒
ℓ
=⇒ 𝑃 ∗𝑀
symexℓ (𝑡𝑟, [ok : 𝑃], 𝑥 := [𝑝], (𝑥 := [𝑝], 𝑃 ∗𝑀) : 𝑡𝑟 ′, [ok : 𝑥 = 𝑒 [𝑥 ′/𝑥] ∗ (𝑝 ↦→ 𝑒 ∗ 𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑒) [𝑥 ′/𝑥]])
SELoad
backpropℓ (𝑀, 𝑡𝑟, 𝑡𝑟 ′) 𝑝 ̸↦→ ∗𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑒
ℓ
=⇒ 𝑃 ∗𝑀
symexℓ (𝑡𝑟, [ok : 𝑃], L : 𝑥 := [𝑝], (L : 𝑥 := [𝑝], 𝑃 ∗𝑀) : 𝑡𝑟 ′, [err (L) : 𝑝 ̸↦→ ∗𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑒])
SELoadErr
backpropℓ (𝑀, 𝑡𝑟, 𝑡𝑟 ′) 𝑝 ↦→ 𝑒 ∗ 𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑒
ℓ
=⇒ 𝑃 ∗𝑀
symexℓ (𝑡𝑟, [ok : 𝑃], [𝑝] := 𝑒 ′, ( [𝑝] := 𝑒 ′, 𝑃 ∗𝑀) : 𝑡𝑟 ′, [ok : 𝑝 ↦→ 𝑒 ′ ∗ 𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑒])
SEStore
backpropℓ (𝑀, 𝑡𝑟, 𝑡𝑟 ′) 𝑝 ̸↦→ ∗𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑒
ℓ
=⇒ 𝑃 ∗𝑀
symexℓ (𝑡𝑟, [ok : 𝑃], L : [𝑝] := 𝑒 ′, (L : [𝑝] := 𝑒 ′, 𝑃 ∗𝑀) : 𝑡𝑟 ′, [err (L) : 𝑝 ̸↦→ ∗𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑒])
SEStoreErr
backpropℓ (𝑀, 𝑡𝑟, 𝑡𝑟 ′) 𝑝 ↦→ 𝑒 ∗ 𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑒
ℓ
=⇒ 𝑃 ∗𝑀
symexℓ (𝑡𝑟, [ok : 𝑃], free(𝑝), (free(𝑝), 𝑃 ∗𝑀) : 𝑡𝑟 ′, [ok : 𝑝 ̸↦→ ∗𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑒])
SEFree
backpropℓ (𝑀, 𝑡𝑟, 𝑡𝑟 ′) 𝑝 ̸↦→ ∗𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑒
ℓ
=⇒ 𝑃 ∗𝑀
symexℓ (𝑡𝑟, [ok : 𝑃], L : free(𝑝), (L : free(𝑝), 𝑃 ∗𝑀) : 𝑡𝑟 ′, [err (L) : 𝑝 ̸↦→ ∗𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑒])
SEFreeErr
Fig. 8. BPSE for atomic commands.
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symexℓ (𝑡𝑟, [ok : 𝑃], 𝑐1, 𝑡𝑟2, [ok : 𝑃2]) symexℓ (𝑡𝑟2, [ok : 𝑃2], 𝑐2, 𝑡𝑟3, [ok : 𝑃3])
symexℓ (𝑡𝑟, [ok : 𝑃], 𝑐1; 𝑐2, 𝑡𝑟3, 𝑃3)
SESeq
symexℓ (𝑡𝑟, [ok : 𝑃], assume(𝑏); 𝑐1, 𝑡𝑟 ′, 𝑄)
symexℓ (𝑡𝑟, [ok : 𝑃], if 𝑏 𝑐1 else 𝑐2, 𝑡𝑟 ′, 𝑄)
SEIfTrue
symexℓ (𝑡𝑟, [ok : 𝑃], assume(¬𝑏); 𝑐2, 𝑡𝑟 ′, 𝑄)
symexℓ (𝑡𝑟, [ok : 𝑃], if 𝑏 𝑐1 else 𝑐2, 𝑡𝑟 ′, 𝑄)
SEIfFalse
𝑐 = (if 𝑏 𝑐1 else 𝑐2) 𝑐1 ≠ 𝑐2
symexℓ (𝑡𝑟, [ok : 𝑃], L : 𝑐, (L : 𝑐, 𝑃 ∗ 𝑏 = true::/ℓ) : 𝑡𝑟, [insec(L) : 𝑃 ∗ 𝑏 = true::/ℓ])
SEIfInsec
symexℓ (𝑡𝑟, [ok : 𝑃], assume(𝑏); 𝑐; while 𝑏 do 𝑐, 𝑡𝑟 ′, 𝑄)
symexℓ (𝑡𝑟, [ok : 𝑃], while 𝑏 do 𝑐, 𝑡𝑟 ′, 𝑄)
SEWhileTrue
symexℓ (𝑡𝑟, [ok : 𝑃], assume(¬𝑏); skip, 𝑡𝑟 ′, 𝑄)
symexℓ (𝑡𝑟, [ok : 𝑃], while 𝑏 do 𝑐, 𝑡𝑟 ′, 𝑄)
WhileFalse
𝑐 = (while 𝑏 do 𝑐𝑏𝑜𝑑𝑦)
symexℓ (𝑡𝑟, [ok : 𝑃], L : 𝑐, (L : 𝑐, 𝑃 ∗ 𝑏 = true::/ℓ) : 𝑡𝑟, [insec(L) : 𝑃 ∗ 𝑏 = true::/ℓ])
SEWhileInsec
Fig. 9. The structual rules of BPSE.
D SEMANTICS
Fig. 10 defines the semantics of the core programming language over which InsecSL is defined,
while Fig. 11 defines the relational semantics of InsecSL’s assertions.
E UNDERFLOW OUTPUT
Fig. 12 shows the ASCII rendering of the summary inferred by Underflow for the top-level
run_auction() for the example of Fig. 1.
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⟨run “skip” 𝑠 ℎ⟩
[𝜏 ]
→ ⟨stop 𝑠 ℎ⟩ ⟨run “𝑥 := 𝑒” 𝑠 ℎ⟩
[𝜏 ]
→ ⟨stop 𝑠 (𝑥 := [𝑒]𝑠 ) ℎ⟩
𝑎 = [𝑝]𝑠 𝑎 ∉ dom(ℎ) ∨ ℎ(𝑎) = ⊥
⟨run “𝑥 := [𝑝]” 𝑠 ℎ⟩
[𝜏 ]
→ ⟨abort 𝑠 ℎ⟩
𝑎 = [𝑝]𝑠 ℎ(𝑎) = 𝑣
⟨run “𝑥 := [𝑝]” 𝑠 ℎ⟩
[𝜏 ]
→ ⟨stop 𝑠 (𝑥 := 𝑣) ℎ⟩
𝑎 = [𝑝]𝑠 𝑎 ∉ dom(ℎ) ∨ ℎ(𝑎) = ⊥
⟨run “[𝑝] := 𝑒” 𝑠 ℎ⟩
[𝜏 ]
→ ⟨abort 𝑠 ℎ⟩
𝑎 = [𝑝]𝑠 ℎ(𝑎) = 𝑣
⟨run “[𝑝] := 𝑒” 𝑠 ℎ⟩
[𝜏 ]
→ ⟨stop 𝑠 ℎ(𝑎 := [𝑒]𝑠 )⟩
𝑎 ∉ dom(ℎ) ∨ ℎ(𝑎) = ⊥
⟨run “𝑥 := alloc(𝑒)” 𝑠 ℎ⟩
[allocate⟨𝑎⟩]
→ ⟨stop 𝑠 (𝑥 := 𝑎) ℎ(𝑎 := [𝑒]𝑠 )⟩
𝑎 = [𝑝]𝑠 ℎ(𝑎) = 𝑣
⟨run “free(𝑝)” 𝑠 ℎ⟩
[𝜏 ]
→ ⟨stop 𝑠 ℎ(𝑎 := ⊥)⟩
𝑎 = [𝑝]𝑠 𝑎 ∉ dom(ℎ) ∨ ℎ(𝑎) = ⊥
⟨run “free(𝑝)” 𝑠 ℎ⟩
[𝜏 ]
→ ⟨abort 𝑠 ℎ⟩
⟨run “output(𝑒ℓ , 𝑒)” 𝑠 ℎ⟩
out⟨[𝑒ℓ ]𝑠 , [𝑒 ]𝑠 ⟩→ ⟨stop 𝑠 ℎ⟩
⟨run “𝑐1” 𝑠 ℎ⟩
𝜎→ ⟨abort 𝑠 ′ ℎ′⟩
⟨run “𝑐1; 𝑐2” 𝑠 ℎ⟩
𝜎→ ⟨abort 𝑠 ′ ℎ′⟩
⟨run “𝑐1” 𝑠 ℎ⟩
𝜎→ ⟨stop 𝑠 ′ ℎ′⟩
⟨run “𝑐1; 𝑐2” 𝑠 ℎ⟩
𝜎→ ⟨run “𝑐2” 𝑠 ′ ℎ′⟩
⟨run “𝑐1” 𝑠 ℎ⟩
𝜎→ ⟨run “𝑐 ′1” 𝑠 ′ ℎ′⟩
⟨run “𝑐1; 𝑐2” 𝑠 ℎ⟩
𝜎→ ⟨run “𝑐 ′1; 𝑐2” 𝑠 ′ ℎ′⟩
[𝑏]𝑠 = true
⟨run “if 𝑏 𝑐1 else 𝑐2” 𝑠 ℎ⟩
[𝜏 ]
→ ⟨run “𝑐1” 𝑠 ℎ⟩
[𝑏]𝑠 ≠ true
⟨run “if 𝑏 𝑐1 else 𝑐2” 𝑠 ℎ⟩
[𝜏 ]
→ ⟨run “𝑐2” 𝑠 ℎ⟩
[𝑏]𝑠 = true
⟨run “while 𝑏 do 𝑐” 𝑠 ℎ⟩
[𝜏 ]
→ ⟨run “𝑐; while 𝑏 do 𝑐” 𝑠 ℎ⟩
[𝑏]𝑠 ≠ true
⟨run “while 𝑏 do 𝑐” 𝑠 ℎ⟩
[𝜏 ]
→ ⟨run “skip” 𝑠 ℎ⟩
[𝑏]𝑠 = true
⟨run “assume(𝑏)” 𝑠 ℎ⟩
[𝜏 ]
→ ⟨stop 𝑠 ℎ⟩
Fig. 10. Small step semantics of the language for InsecSL. For a function 𝑓 we write 𝑓 (𝑥 := 𝑣) to denote
function update, i.e. to abbreviate the function that behaves like 𝑓 everywhere except for the argument 𝑥 for
which it returns 𝑣 .
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Using the abbreviations:
(𝑠, ℎ) ⊨ 𝑒𝑝 ↦→ 𝑒𝑣 ⇐⇒ ℎ = {[𝑒𝑝 ]𝑠 ↦→ [𝑒𝑣]𝑠 }
(𝑠, ℎ) ⊨ 𝑒𝑝 ̸↦→ ⇐⇒ ℎ = {[𝑒𝑝 ]𝑠 ↦→ ⊥}
(𝑠, ℎ) (𝑠 ′, ℎ′) ⊨ℓ 𝑒 ⇐⇒ [𝑒]𝑠 = true ∧ [𝑒]𝑠′ = true ∧ ℎ = ℎ′ = ∅
(𝑠, ℎ) (𝑠 ′, ℎ′) ⊨ℓ 𝑒 :: 𝑒ℓ ⇐⇒ [𝑒ℓ ]𝑠 = [𝑒ℓ ]𝑠′ ∧ ([𝑒ℓ ]𝑠 ⊑ ℓ =⇒ [𝑒]𝑠 = [𝑒]𝑠′) ∧ ℎ = ℎ′ = ∅
(𝑠, ℎ) (𝑠 ′, ℎ′) ⊨ℓ 𝑒::/𝑒ℓ ⇐⇒ [𝑒ℓ ]𝑠 = [𝑒ℓ ]𝑠′ ∧ [𝑒ℓ ]𝑠 ⊑ ℓ ∧ [𝑒]𝑠 ≠ [𝑒]𝑠′ ∧ ℎ = ℎ′ = ∅
(𝑠, ℎ) (𝑠 ′, ℎ′) ⊨ℓ emp ⇐⇒ ℎ = ℎ′ = ∅
(𝑠, ℎ) (𝑠 ′, ℎ′) ⊨ℓ 𝑒𝑝 ↦→ 𝑒𝑣 ⇐⇒ (𝑠, ℎ) ⊨ 𝑒𝑝 ↦→ 𝑒𝑣 ∧ (𝑠 ′, ℎ′) ⊨ 𝑒𝑝 ↦→ 𝑒𝑣
(𝑠, ℎ) (𝑠 ′, ℎ′) ⊨ℓ 𝑒𝑝 ̸↦→ ⇐⇒ (𝑠, ℎ) ⊨ 𝑒𝑝 ̸↦→ ∧(𝑠 ′, ℎ′) ⊨ 𝑒𝑝 ̸↦→
(𝑠, ℎ) (𝑠 ′, ℎ′) ⊨ℓ 𝑃1 ∗ 𝑃2 ⇐⇒ there are disjoint subheaps ℎ1, ℎ2, and ℎ′1, ℎ′2
where ℎ = ℎ1 ⊎ ℎ2 ∧ ℎ′ = ℎ′1 ⊎ ℎ′2
such that (𝑠, ℎ1) (𝑠 ′, ℎ′1) ⊨ℓ 𝑃1 and (𝑠, ℎ2) (𝑠 ′, ℎ′2) ⊨ℓ 𝑃2
(𝑠, ℎ) (𝑠 ′, ℎ′) ⊨ℓ ∃𝑥 . 𝑃 𝑥 ⇐⇒ there are values 𝑣, 𝑣 ′
such that (𝑠 (𝑥 := 𝑣), ℎ) (𝑠 ′(𝑥 := 𝑣 ′), ℎ′) ⊨ℓ 𝑃
(𝑠, ℎ) (𝑠 ′, ℎ′) ⊨ℓ 𝑃 =⇒ 𝑄 ⇐⇒ (𝑠, ℎ) (𝑠 ′, ℎ′) ⊨ℓ 𝑃 implies (𝑠, ℎ) (𝑠 ′, ℎ′) ⊨ℓ 𝑄
(𝑠, ℎ) (𝑠 ′, ℎ′) ⊨ℓ false never
Fig. 11. Semantics of InsecSL assertions.
_(presumes true fails insecure exists int nid334, int nid238, int result232,
struct idqt* result220, int* result224, struct idqt* result216,
int* result213, int nqt335, int result229, int result240, int nqt239,
int* result227, int result233, int v228, int v225, int result329.
!(1 == 2) && !(1 == 0) && ((nqt335 > nqt239) :!: attacker) &&
((result329 - result232) < 300) && (result329 :: low) && !(0 == 2) &&
true && true && (result240 == 1) && ((result233 - result232) < 300) &&
(result233 :: low) && (result232 :: low) && (result229 == 1) &&
(result220 :: low) && (result216 :: low) && (result213 :: low) &&
result213 |-> 1 && &result220->qt |-> nqt335 &&
&result216->qt |-> nqt239 && &result220->id |-> nid334 &&
&result216->id |-> nid238 && result227 |-> v228 && result224 |-> v225)
Fig. 12. The summary Underflow infers for run_auction() from Fig. 1 that provably detects its insecurity.
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